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ARTICLES
Privacy Versus the First Amendment:
A Skeptical Approach
Solveig Singleton*
INTRODUCTION
Richard Posner observed many years ago, that regardless of how
one defines privacy, “one aspect of privacy is the withholding or
concealment of information.”1 Recent proposals to regulate the
uses of transactional information by private businesses in the name
of privacy raise interesting free speech issues, as the recent case of
U.S. West v. FCC2 recognized.3 The tension between privacy, the
First Amendment, and the commercial speech doctrine has barely
been explored outside of cases involving media defendants and
privacy torts.4 This article argues that this tension reflects a
serious conflict between free speech and privacy outside of that
narrow area. The courts should think twice before sacrificing the
mature law of free speech to the less coherent concerns about
privacy.
Within the United States, lawmakers face growing pressure to
develop a top-down legal regime for the governance of privacy and
data. Much of this pressure stems from the differences between
European Union (“EU”) countries and the United States. The EU

* Director of Information Studies, Cato Institute. Reed College, B.A. 1987; Cornell
Law School, J.D. 1992.
1
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Privacy, AMERICAN ENTER. INST. J. ON
GOV’T & SOC’Y, May/June 1978, at 19.
2
182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).
3
See id. (holding that the FCC’s rulemaking on customer information resulting in
“opt-in” regulatory regime violates the First Amendment).
4
See, e.g., Solveig Singleton, Privacy as Censorship: A Skeptical View of Proposals
to Regulate Privacy in the Private Sector, CATO INST. POLICY ANALYSIS, Jan. 22, 1998 at
1; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Information Privacy, and the Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1
(May 2000); Thomas I. Emerson, The Right of Privacy and Freedom of the Press, 14
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329 (1979).
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has enacted such a legal regime, known as the Data Protection
Directive,5 while the United States has not.
The different legal regimes present a classic trade problem as
illustrated by the following hypothetical: Country X prohibits or
heavily regulates certain activity while country Y does not. The
activity continues and expands in country Y, while representatives
in country X become more frustrated. What do we do? Tolerate
the regulatory arbitrage? Sanction country X to remove its
regulations, or sanction country Y to adopt them? In large part the
answer depends on which country we believe is doing the right
thing. With regards to passing data protection laws, there is an
assumption that the European nations are doing the right thing and
the United States is not.6 Thus, the United States is pressured to
move towards a regulatory regime similar to that of the EU.
Meanwhile, the emerging conflict between privacy and free
speech threatens to change the dynamic of the debate surrounding
the extent to which the United States should imitate the EU’s
privacy regulations. Given this conflict, we must seriously
reconsider whose approach is in fact the right one.
Part I of this article explores the foundations of the law of
privacy in the United States, laying the groundwork for
understanding how concepts of privacy relate to each other. Part II
explores the philosophical conflict between free speech and
privacy. Part III examines the commercial speech doctrine and
outlines the broader implications of the use of data in the private
sector for the Constitution and human rights.
I. FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVACY IN THE UNITED STATES
Privacy as conceived in twentieth century case law is a young
legal concept, less developed than the law of free speech.7 This is
not to deny the Fourth Amendment’s constitutional pedigree. As
described below, the concept of privacy has expanded far beyond
the Fourth Amendment and the assorted doctrines that formed the
5

Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31.
See PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, Data Privacy Law: A Study of United
States Data Protection (1996).
7
See Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1375
(1992).
6
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basis for privacy protection in the nineteenth century. Privacy
today still means that the police cannot search your house without
a warrant. However, it also means that the government’s rights to
determine its citizens’ reproductive functions are limited. In
addition, some eccentric rights of privacy have grown up to restrict
private sector activity. The following sections outline key models
of privacy and provide some preliminary background on the
conflict between privacy and the First Amendment.
A. Government Intrusions on Privacy
In order to resolve the conflict between the First Amendment
and privacy rights asserted against the private sector, we must first
explore how the First Amendment relates to privacy rights asserted
against the government.
Obviously, private sector companies that collect data in private
transactions cannot be charged with violating rights to privacy
protected by the Constitution. The Constitution sets forth our
rights against the government, and these are different than our
rights against private citizens. In short, there is no state action
when a private citizen or business collects information about
another private citizen or business.8 It is important to consider
how constitutional rights are related to rights asserted against the
private sector. This section discusses what those federal rights are.
We begin with the Fourth Amendment, which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.9
The Fourth Amendment does not explicitly mention “privacy”,
however, many early cases do.10 The language of the Amendment
8

See, e.g., United States v. McAllister, 18 F.3d 1412, 1417-18 (7th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1993); Pleasant v. Lovell, 974 F.2d
1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Attson, 900 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir.
1990).
9
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10
See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886); see generally Nelson B.
Lasson, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
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ties privacy to property rights.11 The framers of the Constitution
viewed property rights as the root of privacy (as well as other
rights such as free speech).12 Lord Camden’s opinion in the 1765
case of Entick v. Carrington,13 which involved the seizure of
private papers, had a powerful influence on the development of
Fourth Amendment law.14 Lord Camden stated:
Papers are the owner’s goods and chattels: they are his
dearest property; and are so far from enduring a seizure,
that they will hardly bear an inspection; and though the
eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass,
yet where private papers are removed and carried away,
the secret nature of those goods will be an aggravation of
the trespass, and demand more considerable damages in
that respect.15
The centrality of property concepts relating to the understanding
of the Fourth Amendment emerged fully in Boyd v. United
States,16 when the Court proved itself willing to overlook the
evident lack of a traditional “search” or “seizure” in its zeal to
protect private papers. 17
Early in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court encountered a
challenge to this property rights view of private information in a
case concerning wiretapping telephone conversations. 18 The Court
observed that if the telephone company does not object,
wiretapping could not violate its property rights.19 Nor does
anyone using a telephone have a property right in his or her
STATES CONSTITUTION 47-49 (1937); Jacob W. Landynski, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE
SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 29 (1966).
11
See generally William C. Heffernan, Property, Privacy, and the Fourth
Amendment, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 633 (1994) (arguing that property rights are a relection
and expression of personal freedoms, and should receive the same protection).
12
See id.
13
95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765), 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029 (1765).
14
See id.; see also Nelson B. Lasson, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 47 (1937).
15
95 Eng. Rep. 807, 816-17 (K.B. 1765), 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029, 1066 (1765)
(Editors’ Note: Early English Law reporters sometimes offer differing accounts of the
very same proceedings. Though the English Reports citation is given to facilitate the
reader’s easy retrieval of the subject case, the verbatim quotation is from the Howell’s
State Trials version.).
16
116 U.S. at 616 (1886).
17
See id.
18
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
19
See generally id. at 464-66.
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conversation.20 As a result, the Supreme Court ruled that
wiretapping did not require compliance with the Fourth
Amendment.21 Justice Brandeis dissented, following Thomas
Cooley in speaking of “the right to be let alone - the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men.”22 Many years later, Brandeis’ dissent became the law.
In Katz v. United States,23 the Court found that wiretappers must
comply with the Fourth Amendment even when a wiretap does not
involve a trespass.24 Thus, the Court came to establish a privacy
right independent of property rights.
Today a contrary result seems unthinkable,25 and the property
rights theory of privacy has been subordinated to a new theory.
Unfortunately, this may be a case of the baby being thrown out
with the bath water. Once the link between privacy and property
rights has been severed, what takes its place? Whatever it is, it
cannot literally be a right to be let alone, for that is far too broad.
Even a right to be let alone, unless the police have a warrant,
would be a strange legal creature indeed, theoretically barring the
police from even the most casual inquiries or observations on a
public street.
Ultimately, what replaced the property rights theory of privacy
in modern courts is that the Fourth Amendment protects us from
infringements upon a reasonable expectation of privacy.26 This
modern standard is problematic. As several commentators have
noted, it is circular.27 This is partly because whether or not one has

20

See id. at 464.
See id. at 466.
22
Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
23
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
24
See id. at 359.
25
Olmstead was controversial in its day as well. See generally Robert M. Pitler,
Independent State Search and Seizure Constitutionalism: The New York State Court of
Appeals’ Quest for Principled Decision Making, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 45-47 (1996)
(describing response of state governments to Olmstead).
26
See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988); California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 211 (1986); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984).
27
See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349, 384-85 (1974) (stating that the expectation of privacy theory is so
circular that it has no place in a theory of what the Fourth Amendment protects); United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that the Fourth
Amendment analysis must transcend the search for subjective expectations).
21
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an expectation of privacy will depend on whether the law says one
does.
The reasonable expectation of privacy theory gives the courts
little guidance when genuinely new methods of surveillance arise.
In particular, it would not have helped to resolve the status of
wiretapping when Olmstead was decided. Did a reasonable
expectation of privacy exist in a telephone conversation in 1928,
given that wiretapping had been a known method of police
investigation since the late nineteenth century28 and that
wiretapping was known to be a common tactic of feuding private
parties29 and criminals? What role would this reality play in
forming the public’s expectations? Would it depend upon whether
the state in which the wiretap was placed had passed a statute
concerning wiretapping?30 What if the question had arisen in the
nineteenth century before any of these uses or state statutes had
been developed?
If the property rights standard did not answer the above
questions, then the reasonable expectation standard does not seem
to offer any answer at all. When it comes to new networks and
new methods of surveillance, the vast majority of people may have
no expectations whatsoever. If they do, the expectations may be
wildly varied or quite unreasonable. For example, if people today
have an expectation of privacy on the Internet, it can only exist so
long as they do not understand the extent to which the technology
itself is constantly trading information.
Ironically, the reasonable expectation standard will work best
when its expectations are based on property rights. Contracts and
customs might also be the basis for a reasonable expectation of
privacy,31 although these will have little or no utility in many new
cases. As a general matter, the extent to which the reasonable
28

See Pitler, supra note 25, at 45-47.
See, e.g., Washington v. Nordskog, 136 P. 694, 695 (Wash. 1913) (wiretapping by
Seattle Times of detective agency did not violate law for malicious injury to property
because wiretapping does not injure property).
30
See, e.g., 18 Rem. & Bal. Code § 2656 (P.C. 135 § 805) (“Who shall intercept,
read or in any manner interrupt or delay the sending of a message over any telegraph or
telephone line.”), cited in Nordskog, 136 P. at 695.
31
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Fourth Amendment protections
defined by reasonable expectations of privacy are not entirely circular because
expectations are based on objective rules and customs that can be understood as
reasonable by all parties involved).
29
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expectation standard is truly independent of property rights is
questionable.
Notably, the reasonable expectation standard does not create a
right of privacy to records about oneself held by a third party.32
One is said to have given up one’s expectation of privacy when
one discloses information to a third party.33 Similar results may be
obtained under the property rights theory of the Fourth
Amendment, as long as an ownership interest in the information
disclosed is not retained.34 As discussed below, under most
circumstances, one will not be able to assert such an ownership
interest.35
Next, we briefly consider constitutional rights of privacy not
directly arising from the Fourth Amendment. These rights of
privacy are derived from a “penumbra” allegedly emanating from
the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.36 With one exception,37 the penumbra has been
32
See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1975) (recognizing that,
“the prevailing law of invasion of privacy generally recognizes that the interests in
privacy fade when the information involved already appears on [sic] the public record”);
Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 193 (4th Cir. 1990) (explaining that privacy
protection applies to information which the individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy such that to the extent this information is freely available in public records,
protection will not extend).
33
See, e.g., United States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955, 959 (6th Cir. 1990) (criminal
defendant has no expectation of privacy in his pager number because he voluntarily gave
it to another person); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437-40 (1976) (criminal
defendant has no protectable Fourth Amendment interest in his own financial records
maintained by his bank as he has neither ownership nor possession of the records).
34
See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (concluding that there can
be no reasonable expectation of Fourth Amendment privacy protection for refuse placed
at the curb for the purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash collector); see
generally Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (holding that, “[w]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection”).
35
See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40-41.
36
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (finding a right of privacy
inherent in “areas or zones of privacy” to which various constitutional provisions give
rise); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (finding a right to privacy in the
penumbra of the Bill of Rights); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 476
U.S. 747, 772 (1986) (holding unconstitutional portions of a state statute relating to the
regulation of abortion); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (characterizing
past Supreme Court decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, and child rearing or educating as generally limiting the state’s powers to
regulate certain kinds of fundamental decisions).
37
But see, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (holding that possession of
obscene materials in the home is constitutionally protected, essentially finding a privacy
right in the First Amendment). Stanley raises interesting questions but the case is not
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recognized in cases involving reproductive or sexual functions in
the context of the privacy of the person or the home.38 As a
constitutional theory, the “penumbra” is a suspect creation, but the
same results could be obtained under a straightforward reading of
the Ninth Amendment that reserves rights not enumerated in the
Constitution for the people.39
Of all the cases raising the issue of government intrusions upon
privacy, these cases are the least relevant to privacy issues arising
in the private sector because they involve the freedom to engage in
physical activities or functions, rather than a right to keep
information private. Their closest private-sector equivalent is
similar to the right to be free of assault or battery. Additionally,
these cases do not supply us with a right of privacy independent of
property rights, because rights to control our own bodies are in
effect another type of property right.
One fundamental observation arises from the Fourth
Amendment and the “penumbra” cases: The constitutional right of
privacy against government intrusions rarely, if ever, conflicts with
the First Amendment.40
The police can claim no “First
Amendment” right to trespass on one’s property - no more than
you have a First Amendment right to break into a neighbor’s house
to read a poem in his living room.41 In a sense, these
Constitutional privacy cases are First Amendment rights expressed
another way. The right to make one’s own decisions about
reproduction, for example, might easily be expressed as an
exercise of the First Amendment right of free association. The
right not to submit to a search without a warrant is a qualification
of the right not to speak which the First Amendment also
relevant in resolving a possible conflict between privacy and the First Amendment in the
private sector, so it will not be discussed further.
38
See e.g., Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. at 153 (extending the privacy right to a woman’s
right to make autonomous reproductive decisions); Payton v. N.Y., 445 U.S. 573, 601
(1980) (noting that our nation has long recognized the sanctity of the home in the context
of unauthorized entry); Russell D. Workman, Balancing the Right to Privacy and the
First Amendment, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1962-63 (1992) (discussing the history of
privacy rights found in the penumbras of the Constitution which have come to include
marriage, childbearing and family relationships).
39
See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring); see also Randy E.
Barnett, A Ninth Amendment for Today’s Constitution, 26 VAL. U.L. REV. 419 (1991).
40
See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976) (picketers had no First
Amendment right to trespass on a shopping center to advertise their strike against a shoe
company).
41
See id.
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protects.42 The First and Fourth Amendments fit together hand and
glove; both limit government power in similar ways.43 This is
important to keep in mind when addressing privacy regulations in
the private sector.
B. Privacy and the Private Sector: The Brandeis/Warren Article
A standard history of privacy rules applicable to the private
sector in the United States begins with a law review article
authored by Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren in 1890.44
The authors’ inspiration was their concern that “[t]he press is
overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety
and of decency.”45 Warren, in particular, was irritated to find
details of his home life described in the society pages of the Boston
press.46 Brandeis and Warren argued in favor of the creation of a
new kind of property right in personal information akin to
defamation.47 Privacy was not a new concept in American common
law, but the idea of a privacy right independent of other property
rights was novel.48
The focus of Brandeis and Warren on the press raises obvious
First Amendment concerns. The species of privacy rights
advocated by Warren and Brandeis would have been a new kind of
property right similar to defamation in that truth would not be a
defense. The Brandeis/Warren article dismisses First Amendment
concerns, explaining that speech in the “public interest” would be
protected.49 The view that the First Amendment protects only
42

See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977).
See Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 138384 (1992) (noting that the Supreme Court tends to automatically balance the right to
privacy against First Amendment freedom of speech “essentially regularizing this
symbiotic relationship”).
44
See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
45
Id. at 196.
46
See Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1,
6 (1979).
47
See Gormley supra note 43 at 1345 (Warren and Brandeis’ right to privacy
principles illustrated in their 1890 Harvard Law Review article “bore a ‘superficial
resemblance’ to an action for defamation.”).
48
See Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1892 (1981).
49
See Gormley supra note 43 at 1346 (Brandeis recognized that a limitation to the
right to privacy did not extend to matters of “public or general interest”).
43
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speech in the “public interest,” and not other speech was typical of
Nineteenth Century jurisprudence.50 One wonders why Brandeis,
later noted for his more radical First Amendment opinions, did not
address the issue more deeply.
Part of the reason why Brandeis did not address the issue
directly may be explained by the historical context in which the
article was written. Many progressives, including Brandeis,
became supporters of a broad view of free speech only after World
War I.51 In August of 1921, Brandeis said in conversation to Felix
Frankfurter, “I have never been quite happy about my concurrence
in [the] Debs and Schenk cases. I had not then thought the issues
of freedom of speech out—I thought at the subject, not through it.
Not until I came to write the Pierce and Shaefer dissents did I
understand it.”52 Brandeis’s views on the First Amendment when
he first wrote about privacy in 1890 were likely quite different
from his later views.53
Moreover, Brandeis was not as radical on free speech issues as
his contemporaries in the legal mainstream. Unlike the pioneering
nineteenth century First Amendment scholars, Brandeis was not a
free speech absolutist.54 Brandeis valued the importance of free
speech to democratic citizenship. But he thought “the final end of
the State was to make men free to develop their faculties.”55 In
embracing the idea that the State could be trusted with this goal,
this view is still fairly favorable to government regulation of
speech. According to this view, free speech is a means to
democratic ends more than an individual right.

50
See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897) (stating that “freedom of
speech and of the press . . . does not permit the publication of libels . . . or other
publications injurious to . . . private reputation”).
51
See transcript of conversations between Louis D. Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter
(manuscript in Brandeis Papers, Harvard, box 114, folder 14), cited in DAVID M.
RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 362 (1997).
52
Id.
53
See Helen Garfield, Privacy, Abortion, and Judicial Review, Haunted by the Ghost
of Lochner, 61 WASH. L. REV. 293, 365 n.305 (1986) (Brandies’ law clerks noted that his
views on privacy rights were different in 1939 than in 1890 in part due to his hardening
of ideas, lessening of flexibility, and his Puritan strain.).
54
See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
55
Brandeis, cited in RABBAN, supra note 51, at 370.
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C. Privacy in the Private Sector: Privacy in Common-Law and
Equity
Since the nineteenth century, privacy problems involving
disputes between private-sector parties arose in rapidly growing
urban areas as railways developed next to residences and neighbors
struggled to accommodate the needs for light, air, and privacy.56
Concepts of privacy were closely entangled with property
concepts.57 Although a technical trespass was not needed to
recover, an invasion of privacy alone was not enough unless the
invader had created a recognizable nuisance or violated a
cognizable property right in something, such as letters.58
Easement law sometimes referred to privacy. One line of cases
held that it was not wrong to build windows overlooking your
neighbor’s lot, but you could not then complain if he built a screen
on his own property that blocked the view from your windows to
protect his privacy.59 Most American courts adopted this rule that
allowed for rapid, unimpeded construction in our cities and
towns.60 However, under English common law, if you blocked off
56

See, e.g., Muhlker v. New York and Harlem R.R. Co., 197 U.S. 544, 564 (1905);
Roman Catholic Church of St. Anthony of Padua v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 207 F. 897,
903 (3d Cir. 1913).
57
See id.
58
See Barrett v. Fish, 47 A. 174 (1899) (a right of privacy in letters is based on
property or possession of letters); Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1867) (a right of property in letters recognized for purposes of distributing letters
after writer’s death).
59
See Ray v. Sweeney, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 12 (Ky. Ct. App. 1878) (windows
overlooking one’s property can only be remedied by building a screen); Levy v. Brothers,
23 N.Y.S. 825 (Sup. Ct. 1893) (owners of premises that built huge iron sheets blocking
light from neighbor’s windows did not violate neighbor’s right to light and air because
the law would not recognize his loss of property as actionable); Burke v. Smith, 37 N.W.
838 (1888) (screens blocking view and light from neighbors windows were proved to be
motivated by malice and not to keep out prying eyes, constituting an illegal nuisance;
rejected cases in favor of right to erect screens to protect privacy and in favor of easement
of light and air); Athey v. McHenry, 45 Ky. (6 B. Mon.) 50 (Ky. Ct. App. 1845) (where
one landowner had secured no easement for light and air, other landowner was entitled to
erect screens blocking the view of his property); Durant v. Riddell, 12 La. Ann. 746
(1857) (where defendant had erected screen to block view of bedchamber from his
veranda to protect plaintiff’s privacy, plaintiff could not complain of obstruction of light
and view); Klein v. Gehrung, 25 Tex. 232 (1860) (no remedy when windows are built
invading one’s privacy than to build a wall); but see Turner v. Thompson, 58 Ga. 268
(1877) (obstructions designed to protect defendant’s privacy in her garden must be torn
down to supply necessary light and air to windows of plaintiff).
60
See Guest v. Reynolds, 68 Ill. 478, 488 (1873) (explaining that American courts
rejected English doctrine of easements of light and air because of rapid pace of building
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the view from someone’s windows, they could sue for violation of
their easement of light and air.61 Nuisance suits also referred to
privacy concerns. One line of cases involved disputes over
windows placed in party walls.62 A party wall was a wall built half
on a landowner’s property, and half on the land owned by a
neighbor as a means of fire prevention. Such a wall was
considered a nuisance if windows were built into it.63 In
nineteenth-century America, a frequent complaint in such suits
involved the violation of privacy.64 Eavesdropping made up
another type of nuisance also recognized by English common
law.65
Another line of more typical nuisance cases mentioned privacy
issues along with the more familiar complaints of noise, vibration,
and dust.66 These cases arose from the construction of railways
and elevated railway platforms near residences where passengers
could peer into the windows of houses.67 Damages could be
recovered for the diminution of the property’s market value, and
evidence concerning invasions of privacy could be used to

in American cities, and allowing that property owners may build screens blocking off
light and air to protect their privacy).
61
See, e.g., Bury v. Pope, 78 Eng. Rep. 375 (Q.B. 1587) (the owner of land was held
entitled to erect a house against his neighbor’s windows even though they had enjoyed
light for over 30 years).
62
See generally Bartley v. Spaulding, 21 D.C. (1 Tuck. & Cl.) (1892) (where
plaintiff sought an injunction requiring defendant to close windows in a party wall,
claiming that the windows were an interference of her enjoyment and privacy in certain
rooms of her house).
63
See Vollmer’s Appeal, 61 Pa. 118 (1869) (party wall with windows looking into a
neighbor’s property is a nuisance and can be enjoined by court of equity); Milne’s
Appeal, 81 Pa. 54 (1876); Pierce v. New Orleans, 18 La. Ann. 242 (1866) (affirming
injunction requiring blocking of windows in party wall to protect the privacy of a
residence).
64
See DAVID FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 89 (1972).
65
See id. (describing the English common law crime of eavesdropping as listening
“under walls or windows or the eaves of a house, to hearken after discourse, and
thereupon to frame slanderous and mischievous tales”). Eavesdropping was considered
to be a common law nuisance. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *168. See also
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 366 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (stating
eavesdropping was an ancient practice which at common law was condemned as a
nuisance).
66
See, e.g., Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201, 202 (6th Cir. 1932)
(defendant enjoined from permitting dust from the operation of an airport to fly or drift in
substantial and annoying amounts over the plaintiff’s property).
67
See e.g., Roman Catholic Church of St. Anthony v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 207 F.
897, 904 (3d Cir. 1913).
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calculate damages.68 In these cases, American courts followed
English common law.69
Following Prosser’s famous analysis, the growth of common law
privacy torts during the early part of the twentieth century is often
attributed to Brandeis and Warren’s 1890 article.70 Brandeis and
Warren reportedly protested that the groundwork for the new
privacy causes of action was already laid in the common law.71
What they may take credit for, then, is the cautious steps that
courts have taken to create new rights in privacy more independent
of other property rights.72
The privacy torts that came into being during the twentieth
century in many states73 include: misappropriation of one’s name
and likeness for commercial purposes; public disclosure of
embarrassing private facts; publicly placing the plaintiff in a false
light, and intrusion into the plaintiff’s seclusion.

68

See, e.g., Lahr v. Metropolitan Elevated Ry. Co., 104 N.Y. 268 (1886) (recovery
for nuisance may include recovery for loss of privacy); Fulton v. Short Route Ry.
Transfer Co., 4 S.W. 332 (Ky. Ct. App. 1887) (speculation that damage to buildings and
invasion of privacy may occur upon building of railway has adequate remedy at law and
injunction in equity would not issue); Railway Co. v. Gardner, 13 N.E. 69 (Ohio 1887)
(violation of privacy may be considered in calculating damages against railway); Story v.
New York Elevated R.R. Co., 90 N.Y. 122 (1882) (construction of elevated railway is a
taking of property and loss of privacy is part of damages); Shano v. Fifth Ave. & High St.
Bridge Co., 42 A. 128 (Pa. 1898) (evidence as to invasion of privacy must be considered
only as it tends to diminish market value of property); Moore v. New York Elevated Ry.
Co., 29 N.E. 997 (N.Y. 1892) (stating there is no reason why defendants, who furnished
the means and opportunity for persons to invade the privacy of plaintiff by constructing a
railway station and platform, should not be responsible for the consequences of the loss
of privacy as it depreciated the rental value of the rooms in the plaintiff’s building).
69
See id.
70
See William Dean Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960); Pavesich v.
New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905); see also Diane L. Zimmerman,
Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 291 (1983) [hereinafter Requiem] “After the article appeared, courts
and legislatures began to apply the label ‘right to privacy’ expansively to situations that
bore little resemblance to those encompassed in the vague Warren-Brandeis
formulation.” Id. at 296.
71
See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 19 (1890).
72
See Note, supra note 48, at 1893.
73
Rhode Island, North Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin have recognized neither
common law nor statutory privacy claims. See Peter Gielniak, Comment, Tipping the
Scales: Courts Struggle to Strike a Balance Between the Public Disclosure of Private
Facts Tort and the First Amendment, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1217, n.2 (1999).
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The false light tort creates a sort of property right in one’s
reputation and, as a number of commentators have noted, bears a
resemblance to defamation.74 It has little do to with privacy and
more to do with reputation.75 The information provided is
presumably false and recovery is limited to cases where the
representation is substantially inaccurate and the depiction
offensive to the reasonable person.76 Although the doctrines of
false light and defamation are today distinguishable, false light
may very well have originated with defamation.77 In writing about
defamation, Blackstone stated, “A second way of affecting a man’s
reputation is by printed or written libels, pictures, signs, and the
like; which set him in an odious or ridiculous light, and thereby
diminish his reputation.”78 Consistent with the rule that truth was
not a defense to a charge of libel,79 Blackstone’s tort of “odious or
ridiculous” light is a species of defamation to which truth is not a
defense.80 A privacy tort of “false light” is a species of defamation
suit to which truth is a defense.81 The eventual evolution of law
recognizing only a tort of “false light” but not of “ridiculous” light
parallels the evolution of defamation law recognizing truth as a
defense.82 The constitutional limits on the false light tort have
paralleled those of libel law.83 “False light” and defamation law
continue on a similar course—narrower, not broader, than
74
See Farley v. Evening Chronicle Publ’g Co., 87 S.W. 565 (Mo. Ct. App. 1905)
(libel case speaking of picture placing plaintiff in a “false light”); Squires v. State, 45
S.W. 147 (Tex. Ct. App. 1898) (libel case speaking of placing plaintiff in “false light”);
Stewart v. Swift Specific Co., 76 Ga. 280 (Ga. 1886) (holding that a fabricated story
about a woman’s afflictions resulting from cat bite was libelous).
75
See id.
76
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 625E(a) (1977).
77
See supra note 74.
78
Blackstone, supra note 65, at *125.
79
Defamation law originated with the canon law. Under canon law, truth was a
defense to a libel charge. Truth was also a defense to the ancient English offense of
spreading a lie about others. The Star Chamber rejected this tradition, and after the
Chamber was abolished by the common law, truth was no longer a defense to the charge
of libel in England, nor in America at the time the First Amendment was drafted. See
generally Zimmerman, Requiem, supra note 70, at 307-08.
80
See id.
81
See Machleder v. Diaz, 801 F.2d 46, 53 (2d Cir. 1986).
82
See J. Clark Kelso, False Light Privacy: a Requiem, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 783,
835 (1992) (“Courts also have almost uniformly held that the same substantive
defenses—both common law and constitutional—which apply to defamation actions also
apply to false light claims.”).
83
See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1967); Susan M. Gilles, All Truths
Are Equal, But Are Some Truths More Equal Than Others?, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
725, 734 (1991).
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nineteenth century interpretations. Some commentators have
suggested that false light is a dying tort.84
The tort of intrusion upon seclusion resembles the nuisance suits
brought in the nineteenth century to protest invasions of privacy
and the common law of eavesdropping.85 To succeed in a suit for
intrusion into plaintiff’s seclusion, one must show an intentional
invasion, “physical or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of
another or upon his private affairs, or concerns . . . if the intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”86 The plaintiff
must have a reasonable expectation of privacy.87 Intrusion suits
rarely succeed if the information has been gathered in a public
space.88 In this sense, the modern expectations standards refer to
their property-based ancestors.89
The misappropriation tort90 and its descendant, the right of
publicity tort,91 create a new, but very limited property right in
information about oneself.92 Misappropriation cases began to arise
in the latter part of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth
century when the likeness of private persons were incorporated
without the person’s consent into labels or advertisements for
84
See generally Diane L. Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light
that Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 364 (1989) [hereinafter False Light].
85
See Rhodes v. Graham, 37 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1931) (discussing how common law
eavesdropping gives rise to a cause of action for invasion of privacy).
86
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
87
See Sanders v. American Broad. Co., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 595 (Ct. App. 1997)..
88
See, e.g., Gill v. Hearst Publ’g Co., 253 P.2d 441, 444 (Cal. 1953) (photo not
“surreptitiously snapped on private grounds, but rather was taken of plaintiffs in a pose
voluntarily assumed in a public market place”).
89
See Dietemann v. Time, Inc. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (permitting recovery
when pictures taken by guests entering home by subterfuge.); cf. Desnick v. American
Broad. Co., 44 F.3d 1345, 1352-53 (7th Cir. 1995) (intrusion into an apartment); Miller v.
National Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 681 (Ct. App. 1986); Doe v. B.P.S. Guard
Servs., Inc., 945 F.2d 1422 (8th Cir. 1991) (changing areas); Kemp v. Block, 607 F.
Supp. 1262 (D. Nev. 1985); PETA v. Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269 (Nev. 1995)
(videotape intrusion backstage at a performance).
90
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
91
The “right of publicity” laws primarily serve sports figures and movie actors trying
to ensure that they have a monopoly on the distribution and sale of their own images. See
id. It is considered a close cousin of intellectual property law. See Zacchini v. ScrippsHoward Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (holding that justifications include providing
an economic incentive that promotes creative endeavor, and preventing unjust
enrichment).
92
See Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 438 (5th Cir. 1994) (“The tort of
misappropriation of name or likeness . . . creates property rights only where a failure to
do so would result in excessive exploitation of its value.”).
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commercial products.93 It is these cases that first discussed the
Brandeis/Warren article, as well as early precedents, including
English cases, that recognized individuals’ property rights in the
copies of certain images of themselves.94 Misappropriation creates
interests similar to those protected by trademark or intellectual
property law, a property interest in one’s own likeness or name.95
Unlike the Brandeis/Warren article, however, misappropriation
claims are effectively limited to the use of a name or image in
product advertising.96
The tort of public disclosure of embarrassing facts comes
closest, in theory, to embracing a broad view of property rights in
personal privacy. But in practice, skeptical courts have curtailed
it.97 A plaintiff can recover for public disclosure of embarrassing
private facts when another party publicizes a matter concerning his
or her private life, provided the matter would be highly offensive
to a reasonable person and is not of legitimate concern to the
public.98 Recovery is limited to cases where shockingly intimate
information has been revealed.99 The tort is often compared to that
of intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the plaintiff may
be required to meet the same high standard of proof to satisfy
93

See Murray v. Gast Lithographic & Engraving Co., 28 N.Y.S. 271 (C.P. 1894)
(holding that a man cannot enjoin the publication of a portrait of his child when he gave
the portrait to his wife); Marks v. Jaffa, 26 N.Y.S. 908 (Sup. Ct. 1893) (recognizing that
law and equity protect individual from publication of photo in newspaper without his
consent); Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 80 N.W. 285 (Mich. 1899) (rejecting
Warren & Brandeis analysis, holding that name of public figure could be used on line of
cigars without his family’s consent); Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 65 N.Y.S.
1109 (Sup. Ct. 1900) (holding that a girl may enjoin company from printing her picture
on boxes of its product) [citing English cases], overruled by Roberson v. Rochester
Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902) (1902).
94
See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 69 (Ga. 1905). This is the
first case recognizing the right of misappropriation and invasion of privacy.
95
See, e.g., Page v. Something Weird Video, 960 F. Supp. 1438 (C.D. Cal. 1996);
Hicks v. Ballantine Books, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y 1978).
96
See Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 75 F.3d 1391, 1398 (9th Cir. 1996);
Something Weird Video, 960 F.Supp. at 1442.
97
See Zimmerman, Requiem, supra note 70, at 362 (describing law of public
disclosure as presenting “phantom tort cases [that] present facts dangerously near the
edge of triviality based on an evil that judges believe is largely mythical”); Harry Kalven,
Jr., Privacy In Tort Law - Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 326, 336 (1966).
98
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
99
See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Pub. Co., 113 F.2d 806, 807-11 (2d Cir. 1940) (holding that
although article written about plaintiff was “merciless in its dissection of intimate details”
about his life, exposure did not reach the level of a tort).
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constitutional constraints.100 The Court recognized the First
Amendment problems inherent in restricting the publication of
truthful matter in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,101 holding that
the state could not constitutionally forbid a newspaper from
publishing the name of a rape victim that was a matter of public
record.102 Again, the Court emphasized that in both privacy and
libel cases, the information published must be false to be
actionable.103
These miscellaneous torts have frequently come into conflict
with the First Amendment, particularly when brought against the
press.104 The details of these conflicts have been addressed
thoroughly by other commentators.105 It is clear from the case law
that there is a conflict between restrictions on the communication
of even nonconsensual, personal and embarrassing information
about individuals and free speech.106 One commentator explains
that privacy claims raise more serious First Amendment issues
than defamation:
[T]he statement that “Lawyer X has a secret drug
addiction,” could be the subject of both a libel action and
a privacy action. The only distinction is that in the libel
case the speech must be false and in the privacy case the
speech could be true. How can the true speech at stake in
the privacy case be of less constitutional concern than the

100
See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (applying constitutional
constraints developed in libel law to suit based on intentional infliction of emotional
distress); see also Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681 (Ind. 1997).
101
420 U.S. 469 (1975).
102
See id. at 491; Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989) (publication of
truthful information about a matter of public significance cannot constitutionally be
punished without a need to further a state interest of the highest order).
103
See id. at 490 (“[W]here the interest claimed is privacy rather than reputation and
the right claimed is to be free from the publication of false or misleading information
about one’s affairs, the target of the publication must prove knowing or reckless
falsehood.”).
104
See Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1989)
(rejecting a rape victim’s claim that documentary broadcast by a television station
invaded her privacy); Machleder v. Diaz, 801 F.2d 46, 53 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that
plaintiff’s own conduct was accurately captured by television camera so that false light
claim against television networks must fail).
105
See Sean M. Scott, The Hidden First Amendment Values of Privacy, 71 WASH. L.
REV. 683 (1996).
106
See Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765), 19 Howell’s State Trials
1029 (1765).
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same, but false, speech involved in the libel case?107
The privacy torts appear to be losing this conflict, as the
common law privacy actions have been narrowed over the years.108
The courts seem reluctant in assigning property rights to a difficult
concept of privacy and in awarding damages for purely emotional
injuries.109 Plaintiffs rarely recover under these torts and many
Generally,
defendants are granted summary judgment.110
companies that gather information about consumers for credit
reports or mailing lists do not violate the invasion of privacy
standards of liability.111
D. Recent Proposals to Regulate Speech in the Private Sector

Fear of new computer network technology, especially the
Internet, combined with the development of databases that use this
technology, provide a powerful and emotional impetus for the
creation of new privacy rights which could potentially affect all
media. Proposals to regulate the uses of information by privatesector companies have begun to proliferate in the states and in
Congress.112

107

Gilles, supra note 83, at 736.
See Diane L. Zimmerman, Real People in Fiction: Cautionary Words About
Troublesome Old Torts Poured Into New Jugs, 51 BROOK. L. REV. 355, 374 (1985)
(describing factors that limit privacy torts) [hereinafter Real People].
109
See id. at 370 (discussing privacy claims brought against authors of fiction);
Zimmerman, Requiem, supra note 70, at n.5 (finding fewer than 18 cases in which a
plaintiff was actually awarded damages or found to have stated a cause of action
sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment or to dismiss); Lyrissa Barnett
Lidsky, Prying, Spying, and Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering and What the Law Should
Do About It, 73 TUL. L. REV. 173, 207 (1998) (citing study showing that from 1986-1996
defendants prevailed on summary judgment nearly 90 percent of the time).
110
See Zimmerman, Real People, supra note 108, at 374 (“Most courts have . . .
shown commendable hesitancy about allowing plaintiffs to prevail in actions involving
the right of publicity claim, except when the use complained of is related to advertising or
product marketing.”).
111
See Scott Shorr, Note, Personal Information Contracts: How to Protect Privacy
Without Violating the First Amendment, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1756 (1995) (describing
failure of claims against credit bureaus).
112
See Center for Democracy & Technology, Privacy 106th Congress: Summary of
Major Consumer Internet Privacy Bills in the 106th Congress (Nov. 6, 2000), available
at http://www.cdt.org/legislation/106th/privacy/. Privacy Journal, The Latest from PJ: A
Ranking
of
States
in
Privacy
Protection
(1997)
available
at
http://www.townonline.koz.com.
108
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These proposals seek to establish one or more of the following
requirements: (a) disclosure - notice to the consumer describing
how information will be used or transferred to third parties;113 (b)
“opt-out” – providing an opportunity for the consumer to choose
not to have his information used or transferred to third parties
(currently, consumers have the right to “opt-out” of list sales,
though only a minority exercise it);114 (c) “opt-in” - an alternative
to “opt-out”, under which the consumer’s information may be used
only with his express consent;115 (d) access - a requirement that the
business provide the customer with the information it holds about
the consumer upon request, and provide an opportunity for errors
to be corrected.116
One model for current domestic regulatory proposals is the
European Union’s Data Protection Directive. The basic ground
rules for privacy for members of the EU are laid down in the EU
Data Protection Directive (95/46/ED).117 The Data Protection
Directive applies to both electronic and old-fashioned paper filing
systems.118 The data covered by the directive are information
about an individual that somehow identifies the individual, either
by name or otherwise.119 Each national government has the
authority to implement the directive in its own way.120
The Data Protection Directive begins by laying down basic
privacy principles, starting with the idea that information should be
collected for specific, legitimate purposes only, and stored in
113
See UNITED STATES FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION. BUREAU OF CONSUMER
PROTECTION, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS §III(A)(1) (June 1998),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/index.htm.
114
Information Infrastructure Policy Committee, Draft for Public Comment: Option
for Promoting Privacy on the National Information Infrastructure, at 46 (April 1997).
115
PRIVACY ONLINE § III(A)(2).
116
PRIVACY ONLINE § III(A)(3).
117
Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31.
118
Id. art. 3, §1 at 39 (“This Directive shall apply to the processing of personal data
wholly or partly by automatic means, and to the processing otherwise than by automatic
means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of
a filing system.”).
119
Id. art. 2 at 38.
‘Personal Data’ shall mean any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one who
can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an
identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical,
physiological, mental, economic, cultural, or social identity.
See id.
120
Id. ch. II, art. 5 at 39.

SINGLETON.FINAL

116

12/28/00 7:07 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol.11:97

individually identifiable form no longer than necessary.121 The
directive goes on to create specific rights for the person the
information concerns - the “data subject.”122 The entity collecting
the information must give the data subject notice explaining who is
collecting the data, who will ultimately have access to it, and why
the data is being collected.123 The data subject also is given the
right to access and correct the data. Financial data is not treated in
any special way.124
The rules are stricter for companies that want to use data in
direct marketing or to transfer the data for other companies to use
in direct marketing.125 The data subject must be explicitly
informed of these plans and given the chance to object.126 Stricter
rules also govern sensitive information relating to racial and ethnic
background, political affiliation, religious or philosophical beliefs,
trade-union membership, sexual preferences, and health.127 To
collect this information the data subject must give explicit
consent.128 The law does, however, admit several exceptions,
including exemptions for employment contracts, non-profits, and
the legal system.129
Musing over the principles laid down by the directive - the idea
that one has the right to notice and consent to the use of
information about oneself, and to access and correct this
information - one might well ask whether how such broad
principles can be reconciled with many vital or convenient human
activities. Indeed, they cannot be. Thus, the directive has become
riddled with exceptions.130
There is an exemption for data kept for personal and household
use, so that one may keep an address book with the names of
college friends and distant uncles.131 Synagogues, trade unions,
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129

40-41.
130
131

Id. ch. II, art. 6(b), (d), (e) at 40.
Id. ch. II, § IV at 41-42.
Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281), ch. II, § IV, art. 10 at 41.
Id. ch. II, § IV, art. 10(c) at 41.
Id. ch. II, § VII, art. 14(b) at 43.
Id.
Id. ch. II, § III, art. 8(1) at 40.
Id. ch. II, § III, art. 8(2)(a) at 40.
Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281), ch. II, § III, art. 8(2)(b), (d), (e) at
See, e.g., id. ch. II, § VI, art. 13 at 42.
Id. ch. I, art. 3(2) at 39.
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churches, and other non-profits are permitted to keep even
National
sensitive information about their members.132
governments may exempt journalists from provisions of the
directive when, in the government’s view, the interest in free
speech outweighs privacy interests.133 Finally, governments
conveniently exempt themselves from the directive when it comes
to the state’s own monetary or financial interests (e.g. taxation) or
criminal matters.134
Within the United States, as of this writing, 35 privacy bills are
pending in 22 states, many of which would adopt a restrictive “optin” approach.135 One example is S. 129 (1999), repeatedly
introduced in California by Senator Peace, and modeled upon the
European approach.136 The California bill would mandate that
companies implement “opt-in” notices for the collection, storage,
and use of information for marketing purposes.137 A New York
bill, S.B. 691/A.B. 696 (1999), would also establish “opt-in” for
sharing information with third parties, as would H.B. 5962 (1998)
in Michigan.138
Congress has also been drawn to the privacy issue, particularly
in connection with privacy on the Internet.139 Users familiar with
the Internet are likely to be aware that part of the way the Internet
operates is by the ceaseless exchange of information between
nodes and machines, and of the routine practice of electronic
merchants in deploying cookies.140 But this effortless information
sharing is invisible to new-users and may startle them when they
first become aware of it.141
132

Id. ch. III, art. 8(2) at 40-41.
Id. ch. II, § II, art. 7(f) at 40.
134
Id. ch. I, art. 3(2) at 39.
135
An “opt-in” requirement would force businesses to receive consumer consent
before their personal financial information could be sold or used for marketing purposes.
See Rob Garver, Trade Group Coalition Draws Up Battle Plan Against Privacy Laws,
THE AM. BANKER, March 3, 2000, at 2. See generally Privacy Legislation in the States:
1999 Trends, PRIVACY AND AM. BUS. SPECIAL ISSUE, Sept./Oct. 1999 at 1, 3.
136
S.B. 129 (2000), WL 2000 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 984.
137
See Catherine G. Gillespie, Legal Affairs: States Take the Lead in Privacy, CREDIT
CARD MGMT., March 1999.
138
See id.
139
See, e.g., Data Privacy Act of 1997, H.R. 2368, 105th Cong. (1997).
140
See American Survey: We Know You’re Reading This, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 1996,
at 27; see also Virtual Privacy, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 1996, at 16.
141
See Customers Weary About Providing Information Online, ELEC. COMMERCE
NEWS, May 1, 2000.
133
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The recent publicity regarding DoubleClick’s decision to change
its privacy policy, which at one time was not to link real-world
data with Internet-based data gathered through cookies, raised
some interesting common-law questions.142 However, it cannot be
the law that a privacy policy can never be changed. Such a policy
would simply make companies far more hesitant to adopt privacy
policies in the first place. DoubleClick’s newly announced
practice of linking “cookie” information to real world data was
unlikely to result in anything worse than more informed sales
practices on the part of their client companies. This is hardly a
threat to anyone, even if DoubleClick was not planning to provide
opportunities to “opt-out” (as they had announced they were).
Judging by the reactions of privacy advocates, however,143 one
would think that DoubleClick was torturing puppies or
demolishing old-growth forest. The furor was unfortunate and
strongly indicative of the sensationalism and lack of proportion
typical in the rush to privacy regulation. A strong regulatory
reaction threatens to stifle the freely evolving, seamless
communications technology that has been the core strength of the
Internet.144 Such a response came in mid-2000 from the FTC in its
proposal to ask Congress for broad privacy regulation for the
Internet.145
Today a number of bills are pending in Congress to regulate
Internet privacy, these include bills proposed by Senator Leahy (DVt.), S. 854, by Representative Markey (D-Mass.), H.R. 3321, by
Representative Vento (D-Minn.), H.R. 2882, and by
Representative Frelinghuysen (R-N.J.), H.R. 3560.146 Senator
142
See generally Privacy Protections for Consumers, Congressional Testimony by
Federal Document Clearing House, 2000 WL 23833559 (Oct. 11, 2000) (prepared
statement of Andrew Shen, Policy Analyst, Electronic Privacy Information Center).
DoubleClick proposed to create detailed profiles on Internet users. The company came
under fire for linking personal information such as a name and address to online profiles records of what Internet consumers were doing online.
143
See, e.g., Chris O’Brien, Lawsuit Against On-Line Ad Firm Raises New Questions
On Privacy; Some Wonder Whether Policies Can be Trusted, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 7, 2000, at
C13.
144
See generally Shane Ham and Robert D. Atkinson, DoubleClick and Online
Privacy: The Risks of Overreaction, PROGRESSIVE POL’Y INST. BACKGROUNDER, Mar.
2000 (on file with author).
145
See Claudia Willen, FTC Changes Its Tune (Gov’t. Activity), 3 INTELLIGENT
ENTER. 11, July 17, 2000.
146
See ‘Lot of Steam’ For Online Privacy Legislation On Hill, COMMUNICATIONS
DAILY, Mar. 7, 2000.
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Conrad Burns (R-Mont.) introduced S. 809, which would require
web sites to give notice, consent, and access before data about
online consumers could be used, with several exemptions, such as
those for transactional data (defined as information necessary for
using the Internet) and personal data related to legitimate business
activities (such as answering a customer’s email).147 Another bill,
H.R. 1685 was introduced by Representative Rick Boucher (DVa.).148 This bill’s privacy provisions simply require detailed
notice of the uses of personally identifiable information collected
online.149
The typical features of proposed privacy regulation permit
businesses to learn about their customers only under constraining
circumstances.150 Because of low response rates, “opt-in”, in
particular, represents close to an effective ban on business’ ability
to communicate truthful information about real events in which the
business was involved to other businesses or third parties.151 In
U.S. West v. FCC,152 the Tenth Circuit considered a challenge to a
Federal Communications Commission rule that established an
“opt-in” requirement for the telephone company’s use of
‘customers’ proprietary network information” (“CPNI”).153 The
companies would be required to obtain explicit consent from a
customer before the company could use his or her information for
marketing.154 The court found that the rule restricted speech,
rejecting the government’s argument that the telephone companies
remained free to contact customers using non-targeted methods.155
The court described several cases that struck down regulations of
direct solicitation of customers, and concluded that the existence of
non-targeted alternatives was not a substitute for restricted
speech.156 The court reasoned that this was because the First
Amendment protects the right to receive speech, not just the right
147

See id.
See Shira Levine, Following the Flow, AMERICA’S NETWORK, October 1, 2000.
149
See id.
150
See Jessica Litman, Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm?
Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (2000).
151
See U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1232 (10th Cir. 1999).
152
182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).
153
See Dana Grantham Lennox, Hello, Is Anybody Home? Deregulation,
Discombobulation, and the Decision in U.S. West v. FCC, 34 GA. L. REV. 1645 (2000).
154
See id.
155
See id.
156
See id.
148
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to speak.157 The court in U.S. West concluded that the “opt-in”
regime did not amount to an outright ban on speech so it was not
subject to the enhanced scrutiny of outright bans on commercial
speech that the Supreme Court had developed in 44 Liquormart.158
While the latter conclusion is consistent with the existing case
law, it does not make very much sense. This points to a problem
with the court’s commercial speech analysis. Why does a
regulation that restricts speech in most cases get less constitutional
scrutiny than one that restricts it in all cases? Arguably, the former
is more narrowly tailored and more likely to pass any test - but
why a different test? The fact that some speech is allowed does not
at all seem relevant to the question of the constitutionality of the
restrictions on the speech that is not allowed. The content of
targeted speech is likely to be quite different from speech
broadcast to the masses and the latter cannot therefore possibly be
a near substitute for the former. The commercial speech doctrine
thus seems to be out of sync with holdings in other areas of First
Amendment law.159 Perhaps this is related to the mysterious
reasoning in some cases that commercial speech is hard to chill
because it is for-profit,160 reasoning that would apply equally well
to newspapers and books. But, “opt-in” does not merely “chill”
speech, it outright prevents it in most cases because of the costs of
compliance and the risks of liability.161
Even a law requiring disclosure alone can amount to a ban of
exchanges of information that could not be foreseen by the
business at the time of the initial transaction. Europe’s experience
shows us that the total effect of such regulations is a reduction in
the amount and quality of information that has flowed freely in the
shared domain between businesses and consumers, or the
prevention of the growth of such libraries altogether.162 The
157

See U.S. West, F.3d at 1232.
See id. at 1234, n. 5 (discussing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484,
495 (1996)). “Indeed, the telecommunications carriers may utilize a multitude of
communication channels to say whatever they want to their customers.” See id.
159
Louise L. Hill, Lawyer Communications on the Internet: Beginning the Millennium
with Disparate Standards, 75 WASH. L. REV. 785, 816 (2000).
160
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1973); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1975).
161
See, e.g., Banks Stand to Lose Income from New Data Protections, CREDIT RISK
MGMT. REPORT, February 23, 2000.
162
See Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in
Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (2000).
158

SINGLETON.FINAL

2000]

12/28/00 7:07 PM

PRIVACY VERSUS THE FIRST AMENDMENT

121

consumer is given a unique veto power over another’s ability to
learn about him or her, a power that cannot be granted without
diminishing the freedom of others. Because we do not own
information about ourselves as a general rule, this veto power
represents a drastic upheaval in the normal rules of human society.
Like a sudden broadening of privacy torts, copyright law, or
trademark law, most proposed regulation shrinks the public
domain. This conflict is seen between the expansion of copyright
law or trademark law163 and free speech, but privacy law does not
have the constitutional sanction that intellectual property law
does.164
II. WHO OWNS INFORMATION? FREE SPEECH VS. PRIVACY
This part addresses the conflict between privacy and free speech
from a philosophical perspective rather than from a litigator’s
perspective. At the constitutional level, the conflict between
privacy and free speech appears to be yet another balancing
question. Because the rights of free speech and privacy are equally
important, our legal system must somehow provide for both.
Many issues call for balancing, however, what is called for here
is compromise. One cannot balance a contradiction. Moreover, if
one of the asserted interests in the balance is incoherent, it ought
not to be weighed in the balance at all. The purpose of this part,
therefore, is to explore the logic of privacy in great detail, to
determine exactly what rights are being asserted and how they
conflict with rights of free speech.
A. The “I Own Information About Myself” Argument
Privacy is often defined as the right of the subject of the
information to control how the information is used and whether it
163
See, e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications
of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158
(1982) (arguing that since misappropriation and dilution theories of trademark
infringement may protect holders where no consumer confusion exists, application of
these theories may implicate First Amendment concerns, especially when the challenged
use is solely to communicate ideas); Robert J. Shaughnessy, Note, Trademark Parody: A
Fair Use and First Amendment Analysis, 72 VA. L. REV. 1079 (1986).
164
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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is to be communicated to third parties.165 Privacy advocates assert
that people have a general right to control the use of information
about themselves.166 This implies that anyone wishing to transfer
or collect almost any kind of information should first get the
permission of the person whom the information concerns.167 This
is sometimes described as a “right to own information about
oneself.”168 For those who shy away from property rights
language, this might simply be expressed as a right to “control”
information about oneself. Under this view, privacy is an
“assignable right.”169
This idea is familiar in medical and legal ethics and perhaps in
other special professional relationships.170 In these relationships
the expectation makes sense. The legal and medical professions
understand that clients and patients will not confide in them
without the right of confidentiality.171 Even if this right did not
exist by statute, it is implicit in the agreements under which a
doctor treats his patient172 or the lawyer counsels his client.173 This
165
See Oscar M. Ruebhausen & Orville G. Brim, Jr., Privacy and Behavioral
Research, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1184, 1189 (1965) (defining privacy as “the freedom of the
individual to pick and choose for himself the time and circumstances under which, and
most importantly, the extent to which, his attitudes, beliefs, behavior, and opinions are to
be shared with or withheld from others”); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475
(1968) (describing informational control as an aspect of personal liberty); ALAN F.
WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (“Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups,
or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information
about them is communicated to others.”).
166
See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
167
See, e.g., Andrew L. Shapiro, Privacy for Sale: Peddling Data on the Internet, THE
NATION, June 23, 1997, at 11.
168
See Ram Avrahami, Privacy Petition-Background Information, Feb. 1997, at 2 (on
file with the author).
169
See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and
Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 168-69 (1993).
170
See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS 410 (4th ed.1994).
Rights to privacy are valid claims against unauthorized access that have their
basis in the right to authorize or decline access. These rights are justified by
rights of autonomous choice . . . expressed in the principle of respect for
autonomy. In this respect, the justification of the right to privacy is parallel to
the justification of the right to give an informed consent . . . .
See id. Beuchamp and Childress define privacy as “a state or condition of physical or
informational inaccessibility.” See id. at 407.
171
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 comment. (1983). See also
AMERICAN MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, E-505 Confidentiality, available at
www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2503.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2000).
172
See, e.g., DeMay v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881); Horne v. Patton, 287 So.
2d 824 (Ala. 1973) (doctor-patient relationship entails obligation of confidentiality);
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understanding is informed by decades or even centuries of
custom.174
The individual’s right to control information is far from implicit
in other human relationships, such as ordinary business
relationships. To the contrary, humanity’s established freedoms
have always included, with narrow exceptions, the right of human
beings to learn about one another. In the course of a single day,
individuals process an enormous amount of information about the
people they encounter, such as their age and appearance, their
manner of speaking and dressing, and their actions and
preferences. Generally, people do not feel obligated to ask for
anyone’s permission before relaying the information they have
collected to a third party, however embarrassing the subject of the
information might be.
This default rule enables the practice of journalism. Journalists
have no general obligation to get permission before writing a story
about another’s activities, even though the story and the details that
they report may be very personal or sold for commercial value.175
Journalists often use information available over computer networks
to develop and track important news stories. While a newspaper
may be penalized if the information it publishes violates copyright
laws, is defamatory, or violates other common law rights, these
exceptions are very narrow and themselves often collide with First
Amendment rights of free speech.176 Thus, no general consent
Geisberger v. Willuhn, 390 N.E.2d 945 (Ill. Ct. App. 1979) (statutory right equated with
contract right); McDonald v. Clinger, 482 A.D.2d 482 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (tort and
contract liability theories against doctor); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat’l Bank, 367 P.2d
284 (Idaho 1961) (implied duty of confidentiality exists between bank and client).
173
See Taylor v. Blacklow, 132 Eng. Rep. 401 (K.B. 1836); In re Boone, 83 F. 944,
952-57 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897) (describing duties of attorney to client at common law).
174
See In re Boone, 83 F. at 953 (stating that the rule of confidentiality needs no
positive enactment because it “springs from the very nature and necessities” of the
attorney-client relationship).
175
See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (newspaper may publish rape
victim’s name once it is a matter of public record); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374
(1967) (magazine cannot be liable for inaccurate portrayal of an individual’s private life
unless the plaintiff establishes knowing or reckless falsehood); Smith v. Daily Mail
Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (state law punishing truthful publication of the names of
juvenile offenders violates First Amendment).
176
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (newspaper may be
held liable for defamatory statement against public official only if plaintiff proves the
statement was made with “actual malice”); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. National
Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (magazine’s right to publish extensive quotations from
leaked manuscript in violation of copyright law not protected by First Amendment).
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requirement applies to journalists.177
This requires us to consider the details of exactly what it means
to assert a right to control information about oneself. Assume that
a given individual, Grendel, is very ugly, and wishes to conceal
that information from others. As long as Grendel remains at home
behind closed doors, that information remains with him. It is
shielded from others partly by his property rights because the
public does not have the right to march up to his window and peer
in on him. It is also shielded partly by technology because Grendel
has installed the protection of window blinds. In this sense, the
information is entangled with Grendel’s property and no one in the
private sector has the right to wrest it from him.
As soon as Grendel steps into the presence of other people, or
invites people into his home, they will make observations about
him that are in no sense his property. He has disclosed his
appearance to them. Perhaps stated more accurately, they have
used their eyes, ears, and other senses to create their own
information about him. This information exists in the form of
thoughts and sense impressions in their minds. It is conceptually
very difficult to imagine Grendel having a right to control a
thought in someone else’s mind, even when that thought may later
become an observation in a notebook, a comment to a coworker, or
an email to a company.
Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine how the legal community
would deal with a new set of rights that broadly reassigns the right
to control the flow of information from the perceivers of that
information to the subjects of the information. Possession and
control of this type of information would generally be in different
hands, a situation likely to yield endless disputes and extreme
challenges for enforcement.
One might argue, in response, that when Grendel left his house,
he implicitly consented to giving up his right to information
concerning himself to the public. It may also be argued that
explicit consent should be required for any information transfer,
other than information learned through casual viewing in a public
place. This argument is interesting but problematic. It is difficult
177

See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. at 491 (noting that without the
information provided by the press, people would be unable to vote intelligently or register
opinions on the government).
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to uncover what the concept of consent means in these
circumstances, because it is hard to conceive of consent to relay
information learned through casual viewing being withdrawn. If
the public is observing Grendel only on Grendel’s terms, could
Grendel march out into the street waving a sign saying, “If you
look at me, you may not repeat the observation that I am ugly to
anyone else” and make this legally binding on anybody? One
would think not. Grendel’s consent or lack thereof is not relevant.
His entry into others’ spheres of observation simply becomes an
occasion for them to learn things about him. This is part of the
nature of the world, a default rule of human interactions, and not
something to which we consent to.
There is no reason to believe that business transactions take
place under a fundamentally different set of default rules. They
too are human interactions. For example, if one purchases a
lawnmower from Sears, the sale of the lawnmower is an actual
event involving a real person. The opinion that information, such
as the purchaser’s name, address, and buying habits should not be
recorded and transferred without his consent conflicts with the
default rule that facts and ideas, including our names and
addresses, remain free for all to collect and exchange.178 While it
is possible for both parties to the transaction to agree to a different
set of rules governing that information, unless an explicit
arrangement has been arrived at, there is no reason for either party
to suppose that something other than the ordinary default rules
permitting disclosure are operating.
It may also be argued that information learned about consumers
in the course of a transaction is different in the commercial context
because the information has monetary value. Generally, however,
that value is determined by how the business collecting the data,
aggregates, and analyzes it. The consumer’s name, address and so
on have little or no value except in connection with the other
names in the collection.
It is relevant to compare intellectual property law with the idea
that people own information about themselves. Copyright law
protects only the author’s original expression (her choice of words,
178

See generally U.S. West, 162 F.3d at 1232 (holding that a law which prevents a
merchant from communicating with or targeting customers, or limits anything that might
be said to them is an unconstitutional restriction on free speech).
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phrases, and sentences), not the facts and ideas that she
expresses.179 One may not copyright the historical facts of the
battle at Verdun; likewise, one may not copyright the fact that he
or she bought a lawnmower from Sears.180 Patent law is also
limited. It creates a property right in ideas, but only in certain new
ideas within a narrow technical sphere.181 Both copyright and
patent laws are thus much narrower than the proposed right to own
information about oneself.
B. Do New Databases Cross an Invisible Line?
There is an obvious similarity between information collected in
databases about consumers and the information people exchange
regularly with one another informally. With the inclusion of large
amounts of data in modern databases, each additional factoid may
be fairly trivial and harmless when taken by itself, but may be
disturbing to some when taken together. This leads us to ask the
question: Is commercial tracking essentially different from gossip?
The question does more than set up a potentially informative
analogy. It is another way of pointing out that the default rule for
information exchanges in human society heavily favors the free
exchange of information. Why change the rule now? Gossip may
be despised, but it is not illegal.
Oral or email gossip and the collection of transactional data in
the commercial sector are the same in several vital respects. Both
reflect the same general default rule about the freedom of
information. In addition, both exchange information about
reputation, behavior, and trustworthiness, which are very important
in human society.
Anthropologists observe
together.182
Gossip is
179

that gossip holds communities
defined as “informal, private

See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
See Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“No
matter how original the format . . . the facts themselves do not become original through
association.”).
181
See 35 U.S.C.S. § 101 (1994) (The Act states, in part, that “[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the
condition and requirements of this title.”).
182
See Sally Engle Merry, Rethinking Gossip and Scandal, in REPUTATION: STUDIES
IN THE VOLUNTARY ELICITATION OF GOOD CONDUCT, at 50 (Daniel B. Klein, ed. 1997).
180
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communications between an individual and a small, selected
audience concerning the conduct of absent persons or events.”183
In non-literate societies, gossip can be an important means of
storing community history.184 Thus, gossip serves both a social
and an economic function.185 After reviewing evidence on the
function of gossip in ancient and modern communities, Professor
Diane Zimmerman concludes that:
[t]he privacy literature . . . has rarely acknowledged a . . .
body of evidence, casting doubt on the preeminent value
of privacy and suggest that the communication of
information about such personal matters may serve a
successful and productive social function. . . History,
religious doctrines, literature, and the social sciences are
replete with examples that suggest our society is at least
ambivalent about the weight to assign to interests in
personal privacy when they compete with the value of
truthfulness about the character and activities of our
neighbors.186
Gossip and other informal personal contacts serve an important
function in advanced economies. In Nineteenth Century America,
entrepreneurs would increase their sales by acquiring information
about their customers. Customers relied on their neighborhood
banker, whom they knew since childhood, to grant them credit.
They would return again and again to the same stores for
personalized service.
Today, however, most residents of the United States can escape
neighborhood gossip by moving to larger cities. Many business
exchanges occur between strangers who will never meet again.
This anonymity has many benefits, as “formal freedoms and
growing wealth allow people to flee the oppressive constraints of
family, local community, or figures of petty authority, for the
anonymity—and anomie?—of life in large metropolitan areas.”187
Such anonymity also has disadvantages, as noted by Adam Smith:
183

See id.
See id.
185
See id. at 54.
186
Zimmerman, Requiem, supra note 70, at 326.
187
Jeremy Shearmur & Daniel B. Klein, Good Conduct in the Great Society: Adam
Smith and the Role of Reputation, in REPUTATION: STUDIES IN THE VOLUNTARY
ELICITATION OF GOOD CONDUCT at 29 (Daniel B. Klein, ed. 1997).
184
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While a man . . . remains in a country village his conduct
may be attended to, and he may be obliged to attend to it
himself . . . . But as soon as he comes to a great city, he is
sunk in obscurity and darkness. His conduct is observed
and attended to by nobody, and he is therefore likely to
neglect it himself, and to abandon himself to every low
profligacy and vice.188
In large anonymous environments, where strangers deal with
strangers, informal gossip networks can break down. The growth
of modern popular journalism (despised by Brandeis and Warren)
developed simultaneously with the destruction of many private
networks through urbanization.189 However, city dwellers have
actively sought to keep such private networks going, and
sociologists have noted that the free exchange of personal
information continues to play a key social role in modern
society.190
Meanwhile, economic actors must develop new mechanisms of
relaying information to each other about fraud, trust, and behavior
of potential customers. Towards the end of the Nineteenth Century
and throughout the Twentieth Century, formal credit reporting
began to evolve out of gossip networks.191 Dun & Bradstreet,
which reports on the creditworthiness of businesses, originated
with Lewis Tappan.192 Tappan managed credit accounts in his
brother’s silk business and exchanged letters with 180
correspondents throughout the country about the creditworthiness
of businesses in their communities.193
Forty years ago,
community-based nonprofit organizations handled consumer credit
reporting.194 Three nationwide for-profit firms now handle this.195
Today, retailers continue to struggle with the problem of providing
personalized service, controlling inventory, and dealing with fraud
in a more mobile world with fewer “regular” customers. The
188

Id. at 34.
See Zimmerman, Requiem, supra note 70, at 333.
190
See id., at 333-34.
191
See Daniel B. Klein, Knowledge, Reputation, and Trust by Voluntary Means, in
REPUTATION: STUDIES IN THE VOLUNTARY ELICITATION OF GOOD CONDUCT, at 7 (Daniel
B. Klein, ed. 1997).
192
See id.
193
See id.
194
See id.
195
See id.
189
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advent of the Internet has turned this struggle into a crisis.
An Internet merchant is in the position of a blindfolded
shopkeeper. Her ears are also blocked as she can not respond to
comments customers make about her display. She does not know
whether customers look like shoplifters. She cannot guess whether
the customer is a local or a tourist, a one-time visitor or a regular,
or a businessman or a housewife. She does not know the
nationality, age or gender of the customer. Online, strangers are
dealing with ever more distant strangers. The collection of data
using “cookies” and other devices has become part of the way the
Internet works as a natural substitute for the incredible array of
information we get through gossip, face-to-face encounters,196 and
traditional, not-very-detailed compilations of public records.
The equivalence of gossip and consumer databases suggests that
there is no need to treat the evolution of databases as a crisis.
Those who argue for a new legal regime for privacy, however,
view new uses of information as having crossed an “invisible line”
between permissible gossip and violative information collection.197
While the use of new technology to collect information may make
people uneasy, is there any reason to suppose that any harm that
might result will amount to greater harm than the harm that could
come from being a victim of vicious gossip?
Advocates of the creation of new privacy rights argue that the
compilation of data about consumers does more damage than
gossip because it takes place on a larger scale.198 Brandeis and
Warren argued that “as long as gossip was oral . . . [one’s] peace
and comfort were . . . slightly affected by it.”199 The same view is
echoed today:
Twenty years ago, say, the local butcher might know that
Mrs. Jones bought a ham every Saturday. That was, in a
sense, public information. Yet it was not widely
available. Perhaps the butcher let the mustard merchant
know about Mrs. Jones; but there was no easy way for
196
See generally JONATHAN COLE, ABOUT FACE (1998) (describing research and
interviews explaining how humans exchange information through facial expressions).
197
See generally Virtual Privacy, supra note 140, at 16.
198
See id.
199
E. L. Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen: To his Reputation, SCRIBNER’S
MAGAZINE, July 1890, at 66, quoted in Warren & Brandeis, supra note 44, at 217 n. 4..
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just anybody, out of idle curiosity or for any other reason,
to find out. This is changing.200
Another new privacy advocate adds that, “new retail distribution
of sensitive personal information to the public at large increases
the social risk of exposing previously private information to
friends, colleagues and enemies.”201
But consumer databases cannot be meaningfully distinguished
from gossip on the grounds that gossip causes no harm because it
is less widely distributed. Historically, gossip exchanged within
small communities could cause terrible harm, because public
commentary within those communities had powerful influence
over others’ lives.202 One anthropologist notes that in an isolated
Spanish village, “[p]eople live very close to one another under
conditions which make privacy difficult. Every event is regarded
as common property and is commented upon endlessly . . . .
People are virtuous for fear of what will be said.”203
Returning to the butcher example, if buying ham were
considered controversial within Mrs. Jones’ religious community,
her reputation could suffer great damage. “When individuals are
dependent on one another for cooperative hunting, farming,
herding, or for access to wage labor, gossip and the reputations it
creates can have serious economic consequences.”204 Without a
good reputation, a participant in a medieval community could not
serve as a witness or plaintiff in a legal proceeding.205 In feudal
society, one’s right to hold land depended upon one’s reputation
for faithfulness.206 Under Roman law, an individual’s rights as a
citizen could be lost if the individual gained a reputation for bad
moral conduct.207
The collection of consumer information on a larger scale in a
butcher’s database actually is less likely to have a harmful impact
on Mrs. Jones’ life than gossip. The few people who have access
to the information on the database will not particularly care about
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207

Virtual Privacy, supra note 140, at 16.
Avrahami, supra note 168, at 4.
See Merry, supra note 182, at 47.
See id. (quoting a study of an Andalusian town).
Id. at 59.
See Zimmerman, Requiem, supra note 70, at 327-28.
See id. at 328.
See id.
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Mrs. Jones or have any power over her, especially if Mrs. Jones is
a typical resident of a large, anonymous urban community.
Furthermore, commercial compilations of data about consumers
are likely to be much more accurate than gossip. Companies in the
business of collecting and selling consumer information, whether it
relates to purchasing habits or credit history, have an incentive to
sell correct and accurate information. Those who maintain
commercial databases also have a concrete profit incentive to get
the details right. Admittedly, errors do occur at times. Many
complaints about private databases surface when people find errors
in their credit reports.208 But the evidence suggests that, on the
whole, rates of error in credit reports are low.209 Two highly
publicized, yet biased, studies misleadingly report high rates of
error in credit reporting (from 30 to 50 percent).210 A 1991 study
by Consumers Union relied on its own employees and their
acquaintances to review their own credit reports and report
inaccuracies.211 Consumers Union did not check whether those
claims of inaccuracy were true or false or try to identify the source
of the errors.212 The Public Interest Research Group (“PIRG”) also
failed to select a random sample in their study.213 The PIRG
estimated an error rate from a sample of consumers who had
reason to suspect that errors were present and who paid to have
their credit reports reviewed.214 A more rigorous study of 15,703
consumers, conducted by Arthur Anderson & Co., showed that the
true error rate for non-trivial errors is probably as low as one to
three percent.215
Finally, databases of information about consumers tend to be
more impersonal and protective of consumer privacy than gossip.
208
See Daniel B. Klein & Jason Richner, In Defense of the Credit Bureau, 12 CATO
JOURNAL 393, 402-07 (1992) (discussing Consumers Union Study “What Are They
Saying About Me?,” Apr. 29, 1991); Edmund Mierzwinski, Nightmare on Credit Street
or How the Credit Bureau Ruined My Life, REPORT, UNITED STATES PUBLIC INTEREST
RESEARCH GROUP, June 6, 1991.
209
See Klein, supra note 208, at 403-04.
210
See id.
211
See id.
212
See id.
213
See id.
214
See id. at 405-07. The PIRG study also failed to identify the source of the errors,
and reported anecdotes featuring consumers’ unconfirmed assertions that their reports
contained errors. See Mierzwinski, supra note 208.
215
See Klein, supra note 208, at 407-08.
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Companies that collect information about consumers carefully
protect that information from competitors in order to preserve their
investment . These measures also preserve consumer privacy. For
example, when the company sells the use of its list to a direct
marketer, it often does so through a third-party “fulfillment house.”
The fulfillment house compiles lists, creates mailing labels, and
attaches those labels to be sent in the mail. The marketer does not
even see the list or the labels, let alone the information in the files.
To preserve its reputation, the fulfillment house must protect the
company’s list from disclosure. Companies enforce this by
“seeding” the lists with dummy entries, usually fake names and
real addresses. If those addresses begin to get mail from
competitors, the company knows that the fulfillment house has
betrayed the secrecy of its list.216
To summarize, databases of consumer information are likely to
be substantially less harmful than gossip. These databases have
also welcomed benefits, such as lower prices and better consumer
services. The benefit offered by gossip, i.e., greater conformance
to social norms is unlikely to be appreciated by the subject, but he
is apt to be pleased with a lower credit card rate.
III. PRIVACY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Few cases have addressed the potential conflict between privacy
regulation and the First Amendment. As it is unclear whether
privacy regulations will be enacted, or what form they will take
(“opt out” or “opt in,” the extent of disclosure or access
requirements), this part will not analyze the constitutionality of
every possible permutation of privacy regulation. Rather, this part
will survey the issues that are likely to arise in those cases, and
explores how the issues should be resolved.
Many different kinds of regulations that restrict speech and
information already exist, from obscenity to intellectual property,
from defamation to insider trading laws, from the Fair Credit
Reporting Act to the FDA’s mandatory labeling requirements. Just
what is it that makes the potential conflict between privacy
216

See Letter from Peter Vanderschraaf, California Institute of Technology, to
Professor Dan Klein, University of California at Irvine 1 (June 23, 1995) (on file with
author).
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regulation and the First Amendment more difficult, or more
interesting, than these other restrictions on speech? In some cases,
very little. To say that privacy regulation raises free speech issues
is not to say that these other regulations do not. Clearly,
intellectual property laws, mandatory labeling requirements, and
defamation raise serious First Amendment issues. To discuss how
they are resolved is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless,
the fact that these laws coexist with the First Amendment does not
mean that no First Amendment issue exists with respect to privacy
regulation. Furthermore, in resolving First Amendment cases, the
courts examine each proposed regulation on its own merits.217
Each regulation affects a different type of speech, is supported by a
different rationale for regulation, and requires different tailoring.218
Private-sector privacy regulations are distinguishable from the
examples listed above.
Unlike intellectual property rights,
property rights in privacy do not have constitutional sanction.
Copyright, patent, and trademark laws affect a small range of
potential information when compared to a system of privacy
regulation that would give people property rights in facts about
themselves. Other types of regulation, such as insider trading rules
or the Fair Credit Reporting Act, address specific problems in
fairly narrow industry sectors.219 There are various exceptions that
restrict the rule of freedom of information.220 Adopting allencompassing privacy regulations, however, would take these
exceptions and make them the rule. This will result in an
extraordinarily broad array of observations and facts about real
people and real events to be simply taken out of the shared domain
of research. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the
problems inherent in punishing true speech.221 An omnibus system
217
See, e.g., Thornburn v. Austin, No. 99-2146, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 25980 (8th
Cir. 1999).
218
See id.
219
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (2000) (requiring that consumer reporting agencies
adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit,
personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the
consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization
of such information).
220
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(6) (1996) (restricting the release of personnel and
medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy).
221
See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (“truth may not be the subject
of either civil or criminal sanctions”); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341
(1974) (finding that the First Amendment protects “some falsehood in order to protect
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of privacy regulation would mark an extremely radical change in
the legal framework for the flow of information through the
economy.
The next part explores the questions that are likely to arise in
any First Amendment challenge to privacy regulation. The
primary issues are whether the speech in question is classified as
commercial or non-commercial speech, the strength of the
government’s interest in regulating the speech and whether the
proposed legislation is narrowly tailored to suit its purpose.
A. Is It Commercial Speech?
Suppose Alice orders a widget from Budget Widgets. In the
course of the transaction, Budget learns her name, address, and
notes that she has ordered a widget. Her name is then transferred
within Budget to a list of persons who might be interested in
widget upgrades, a special widget warrantee package, or widget
accessories. Budget also notes the type of widget she bought - one
particularly sized for tall people. Budget had only recently begun
to offer widgets in different sizes in certain test markets to
determine whether there are enough buyers in the petite and tall
markets to overcome problems with inventory control. Another
company, Case Co. makes leather carrying cases for widgets. Case
Co. rents the list containing information about widget buyers from
Budget Widget, and ultimately contacts Alice.
Obviously, some of these contacts fall within the traditional
definitions of commercial speech, for example if Alice was
solicited directly by phone. But other transfers of the information,
such as Budget’s creation of the information database, its internal
uses of the information, and its transfer to Case Co., do not fit the
definition of commercial speech.222 The database itself, is more
[truth]”).
222
See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York,
447 U.S. 557 (1980). Central Hudson established the following inquiry to test the
constitutionality of a restriction on commercial speech:
a) Does the speech accurately promote a legal product or activity?
b) Is the government’s interest in regulating the speech substantial?
c) Does the regulation directly advance the government interest at issue?
d) Is there a reasonable fit between the regulation and the interest it is intended
to further?
Id. at 564.
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like a library than an advertisement.
Commercial speech was first defined as speech that “did no
more than propose a commercial transaction,”223 and later, more
broadly, as “expression related solely to the economic interests of
the speaker and its audience.”224 Traditionally, advertising, inperson solicitation, and similar activities constituted commercial
speech.225 When companies collect and use consumer data, and
subsequently share it with other businesses for product
development and inventory control, it does not resemble traditional
commercial speech. However, if the data is actually used for
marketing, it will at least in some aspect involve commercial
speech.
Courts face a struggle in determining when and whether privacy
regulations affect commercial speech and when they affect
ordinary speech. For example, the Supreme Court has declined to
decide whether credit reports are commercial speech,226 although
some lower courts had held that they are.227 Credit reports, at
least, involve economic information. Other databases will present
harder issues.
In U.S. West v. FCC,228 U.S. West argued that some of the
speech affected by the FCC regulation, particularly the transfer of
the information within the company, was not commercial
speech.229 The court rejected this argument on the grounds that the
intra-company speech was too closely related to marketing.230 The
court stated that “when the sole purpose of the intra-carrier speech
based on CPNI is to facilitate the marketing of telecommunications
services to individual customers, we find the speech integral to and
inseparable from the ultimate commercial solicitation. Therefore,
223
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
385 (1973).
224
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561.
225
See id. (defining commercial speech as expression that serves the economic
interest of the speaker while at the same time assists consumers and furthers societal
interests in the dissemination of information).
226
See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 n. 8
(“We . . . do not hold . . . that the [credit] report is . . . commercial speech.”).
227
See, e.g., Millstone v. O’Hanlon Reports, Inc., 528 F.2d 829, 833 (8th Cir. 1976);
cf. Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet, 438 F.2d 433 (3d Cir. 1970) (credit reports are analogous
to commercial speech in receiving less First Amendment protection).
228
182 F.3d 1224 (1999).
229
See id. at 1228.
230
See id.
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the speech is properly categorized as commercial speech.”231 The
court examined the regulations under the Central Hudson test for
commercial speech.232
This approach has the advantage of simplicity, but the analysis
will not be appropriate to all types of privacy regulation. In the
U.S. West case, the regulations targeted uses of CPNI for
marketing purposes.233
Some broader proposed forms of
regulation along European lines (e.g., state privacy bills) would
regulate the use and trade of information for many purposes, such
as inventory control or product development.234 The fact that some
commercial speech might lie at either end of the process for using
the information is fairly incidental. The goal of the regulation is to
control the information itself, not advertising or the attempt to sell
a product.235
Furthermore, determining whether a given use of data is
considered commercial speech depends on the current status of the
commercial speech doctrine in the Supreme Court. When the
commercial speech doctrine first evolved, part of the rationale for
giving commercial speech limited protection was that it was valued
less than political speech.236 But the Court has taken steps in
recent years away from that approach.237
First, commercial speech has recognized value to consumers.
Empirical studies of advertising, conducted in the decades after the
commercial speech doctrine came into existence, reject the view
that advertising and marketing are essentially exploitive activities
that are of no benefit to consumers.238 Today, advertising is
understood to enhance competition between similar products and
to lower prices. This leads to higher quality products and more
choices. Should the Supreme Court consider a challenge to
privacy regulation to affect only, or primarily, commercial speech
231

See id. at 1233.
See id. at 1233-39.
233
See U.S. West, 182 F.3d 1224.
234
See Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the
U.S. Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 541 (1995).
235
See Anita L. Allen, Privacy as Data Control: Conceptual, Practical, and Moral
Limits of the Paradigm, 32 CONN. L. REV. 861, 863 (2000).
236
See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 (1986).
237
See Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
238
See generally JOHN E. CALFEE, FEAR OF PERSUASION: ADVERTISING AND
REGULATION (1997).
232
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as opposed to ordinary speech? If so, the “value” of commercial
speech will certainly be raised again with a vengeance. Courts
have already recognized the value of credit reporting to
consumers.239 Data about consumer transactions is widely used
throughout the economy to start new companies, charities,
grassroots political groups, to develop new products, to establish
new markets, to dramatically lower the costs of distributing
products, and to control fraud. There is no question that this has
benefited U.S. consumers. For example, credit card rates in the
United States are generally much lower than in Europe.240 In this
sense, networks that relay information about transactional behavior
have produced general benefits that may not be entirely captured
by the private economic actors that invested in their creation.
These networks have some of the characteristics of “public
goods.”241
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the ranking of certain
types of speech as having less value than other types of speech has
a dubious constitutional pedigree. It is not clear whether the
framers of the Constitution intended the Federal Government to
protect primarily political speech, and not private speech.242 Much
has been made of the fact that the framers evidently did not
entirely disapprove of libel and defamation law.243 Many of these
discussions entirely neglect that libel law was state law244 and the
Constitution intended to describe only the powers of the federal
239
See, e.g., Wilson v. Retail Credit Co., 325 F. Supp. 460, 467 (S.D. Miss. 1971),
aff’d, 457 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1972); Tureen v. Equifax, Inc., 571 F.2d 411, 416 (8th Cir.
1978).
240
See International: Americans Heat Up the U.K. Credit Card Market, CREDIT CARD
NEWS (Oct. 1, 1999) (stating that few credit card offers overseas are as low as what U.S.
banks have made to individuals stateside).
241
A public good is nonexclusive, meaning that someone can enjoy the good without
paying for it. Also, the consumption of a public good is non-rivalrous, meaning that
when one person uses the good, he does not diminish the benefits that anyone else can
receive from it. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1998).
242
See O. Lee Reed, A Free Speech Metavalue for the Next Millennium: Autonomy of
Consciousness in First Amendment Theory and Practice, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 9 (1997)
(describing that Justice Brandeis, in Whitney v. California, stated that the Framers
believed “the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties,” but
he immediately followed by asserting that free speech is a “means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth” and that “public discussion is a political duty”).
243
See generally William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a
Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91 (1984).
244
See id. at 126, n. 182 (1984) (citing 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2151 (1798) and
discussing the remarks of John Nicholas, Edward Livingston, and Albert Gallatin).
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government.245 The question of whether the framers would
tolerate libel law does not resolve whether they intended the
federal government to have any powers over speech.
The history and structure of the First Amendment suggests that
the framers had no intention to regulate speech. Federalists such as
James Wilson246 and Alexander Hamilton247 argued that the Bill of
Rights was not necessary because the Constitution supposedly
gave the government no power to do those things that the Bill of
Rights prohibits.248 Madison also shared this view, and ultimately
supported the Bill of Rights as politically necessary to persuade
opponents to ratify the Constitution.249 The framers thus had no
intention that the federal government have the power to regulate
speech, and with that in mind it cannot be true to the Constitution
to treat some speech as different from other speech.
Furthermore, the Ninth Amendment makes it clear that even if
the First Amendment can be interpreted to protect only or
primarily political speech, the Ninth Amendment stands in reserve
to protect our rights to learn things about other human beings in the
more ordinary course of our lives.250 In short, it is a mistake to
think that the First Amendment gives us our rights of free
speech.251 Rather, those rights already exist: the First Amendment
merely sets out some of the rights that are to be protected, but it

245

See id. at 125 (“Nowhere in the constitutional convention or the state ratification
debates is there anything close to an understanding that the Constitution was meant to
impart or to countenance a federal power to punish seditious libel.”).
246
See James Wilson, Speech in the State House Yard, Oct. 6, 1787 in 2 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 167-72 (Merrill
Jensen ed., State Historical Soc. of Wis. 1976).
247
Alexander Hamilton wrote that:
[A] bill of rights . . . is not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution but
would even be dangerous,” and that [any bill of rights] “would contain various
exceptions to powers which are not granted; and on this very account, would
afford a colourable pretext to claim more than were granted. For why declare
that things shall not be done which there is no power to do? Why for instance,
should it be said, that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no
power is given by which restrictions may be imposed? . . . [T]he Constitution
is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, a Bill of Rights.
THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513-15 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
248
See id.
249
See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 94 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
250
JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 34-41
(1980) (discussing the reasoning behind the enactment of the Ninth Amendment).
251
See id.
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was never intended to be an exclusive list.252 As Justice Black
pointed out long ago, whatever the framers may have thought of
the value of different kinds of speech, they evidently thought that
the federal government could not be trusted with such subjective
questions.253 There is also no indication that the courts were
supposed to be involved in making such evaluative decisions in
selecting some categories of speech for more protection than
others.254
This appears relevant in answering questions about privacy
regulation because the Supreme Court has in some areas treated
information about public figures and newsworthy events
differently than they would private speech.255 This trend began
when the constitutionality of many privacy torts came into
question and newsworthy speech was considered the only speech
worthy of protection.256 The Court then gathered entertaining
speech into the fold of the constitutionally protected.257
Commercial speech, fighting words, and obscenity were left out.
In recent years, true commercial speech has to a great extent been
brought back in and afforded greater protection.258 It would
252

See id.
Justice Black stated:
[P]eople were afraid of the new Federal Government. I hope that they have not
wholly lost that fear up to this time because, while government is a wonderful
and an essential thing in order to have any kind of liberty, order or peace, it has
such power that people must always remember to check them here and balance
them there and limit them here in order to see that you do not lose too much
liberty in exchange for government.
Edmond Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment “Absolutes”: A Public Interview, 37
N.Y.U. L. REV. 549, 557 (1962). See also Solveig Singleton, Reviving a First
Amendment Absolutism for the Internet, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 279, 300-05 (1999).
254
See Gilles, supra note 83, at 741.
255
This is particularly true in the area of libel law. See, e.g., New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See Gilles, supra note 83, at 736-40; Dun & Bradstreet,
472 U.S. at 758 (stating that the “actual malice” standard of libel law does not apply to
speech that is not of public concern). See also Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,
475 U.S. 767 (1986).
256
See Diane L. Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity?, 9 J. ART &
ENT. LAW 35, 58, notes 59-63 (1998).
257
See id.
258
See Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 497-98 (1996)
(abandoning Posadas case); Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Bus. and Prof’l Regulation, Bd. of
Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136 (1994) (state ban of truthful use of terms “CPA” and “CFP”
by accountants is unconstitutional); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507
U.S. 410 (1993); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 781 (1993); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.
514 U.S. 476 (1995).
253
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logically follow that the treatment of other truthful private speech
would keep up. The constitutionality of libel, misappropriation,
and the right of publicity have not caught up entirely with these
developments.
The idea of holding some true speech as less valuable than other
true speech makes little sense.259 It raises the problem of
distinguishing speech that is of public concern from speech that is
not.260 It comes dangerously close to contradicting the wellestablished principle that the press should not enjoy special
privileges under the First Amendment to defy laws that others must
obey.261 Any special status for matters of “public concern” or
special exemptions for the press are likely to be increasingly
incoherent in the age of the Internet, which is breaking these
boundaries down. The structure and language of the Constitution
do not protect only political speech, but ordinary private speech as
well.262
In summary, it does not automatically follow that because
companies involved in the transfer of transactional data about
consumers are for-profit and that the information is sold, that the
speech in question must be characterized as commercial speech.
Regardless of whether it is determined to be commercial speech or
ordinary private speech, in the system of unregulated flow of
information in the economy, speech as a whole has substantial
benefits for consumers. Thus it is in the public interest to extend
First Amendment protection to such speech.
259

See Gilles, supra note 83, at 739.
The Court has failed to offer any rationale for holding that some true speech is
of more importance than other true speech, or to use its terminology, that some
true speech is of public concern, and other true speech is not . . . . [T]he Court
lacks any doctrinal or theoretical basis from which to assert that valueless true
speech exists.
See id.
260
See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 786 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he five
Members of the Court voting to affirm the damages award in this case have provided
almost no guidance as to what constitutes a protected matter of public concern.”).
261
Cf., id. at 781-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Perhaps most importantly, the
argument that Gertz should be limited to the media misapprehends our cases. We protect
the press to ensure the vitality of First Amendment guarantees. This solicitude implies no
endorsement of the principle that speakers other than the press deserve lesser First
Amendment protection.”).
262
See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969) (holding that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit making private possession of obscene material a
crime); see also William C. Heffeinan, Privacy Rights, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 737, 754
(1995).
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B. The Nature of the Government’s Interest
Determining the nature and strength of the government’s interest
in particular privacy laws and regulations also poses a challenge
for courts considering the constitutionality of privacy
regulations.263 Commentators often lump Fourth Amendment
claims attempting to regulate one’s body or person together with
databases containing consumer data in order to assert that there is a
general interest or “basic right” to something called privacy.264
It would be remiss of the courts to treat privacy as an amorphous
lump in considering the constitutionality of private sector privacy
regulations. To begin with, government violations of privacy do
not raise First Amendment issues at all.265 The very existence of
the Constitution is founded on the premise that government is a
“necessarily evil” and that it poses a unique threat to liberty that
private sector actors do not.266 Therefore, whatever rights the
private sector may violate in gathering information, these are not
constitutional rights.267 The court in U.S. West properly asked the
government to assert an interest in privacy regulations that was not
founded on constitutional privacy cases.268
263

See Zimmerman, Real People, supra note 108, at 368 (“[P]rivacy interests as a
general matter lack the ratification conferred by long historical acceptance. Privacy as a
tort-protected interest goes back less than a century, and its legal status is still relatively
weak when compared to defamation.”).
264
See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 413-15 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting)
(describing privacy as a “basic right” stemming from the Constitution).
265
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971) (“An agent acting - albeit unconstitutionally - in the name of the United
States possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an individual trespasser exercising
no authority other than his own.”).
266
See id.
267
See Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 326 notes 14-17 (2d Cir. 1978)
(describing the distinction between common law and constitutional privacy claims);
Drake v. Covington County Bd. of Educ., 371 F. Supp. 974, 980 (M.D. Ala. 1974)
(Johnson, C.J., concurring) (stating that the Warren-Brandeis right of privacy is a creature
of state law and is not constitutionally based); Mimms v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.
352 F. Supp. 862, 865 n. 5 (E. D. Pa. 1972) (distinguishing right of privacy from
constitutional cases); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (constitutional right to
privacy limited to unreasonable government searches or interference with matters relating
to family and reproduction).
268
In U.S. West, the court explained that:
The breadth of the concept of privacy requires us to pay particular attention to
attempts by the government to assert privacy as a substantial state interest . . . .
We emphasize that the privacy interest in this case is distinct and different from
the more limited notion of a constitutional right to privacy which is addressed in
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Although the privacy claims asserted against the private sector
are not constitutional claims, courts may analogize between private
sector and Fourth Amendment privacy cases. Under both Fourth
Amendment law and private sector privacy cases, the question of
the people’s expectation of privacy has become part of the
definition of privacy.269 This analogy, however, does not favor
broad expectations of privacy rights in the private sector because
the interpretation of privacy expectations in the Fourth
Amendment context is very narrow.270 Evidently, one would not
reasonably expect that the police would not read their home’s heat
signature271 or pick through their garbage.272 It is difficult to
understand how one could reasonably expect operators of web sites
or stores not to make notes of information about their customers –
the very same information that merchants historically have stored
away in their memories in the course of ordinary transactions.
Justifications for the extension of privacy rights against the
private sector taken alone, however, suffer from a similar lack of
precision in attempting to assert a government interest. The court
in U.S. West concluded that the government’s interest in the CPNI
regulations was to protect people from embarrassing revelations
about who they had called and when.273 The court noted that the
government “cannot satisfy the second prong of the Central
Hudson test by merely asserting a broad interest in privacy,” and
called for a particular description of the type of privacy served. 274
The court added that “privacy is not an absolute good because it
imposes real costs on society. Therefore, the specific privacy
interest must be substantial, demonstrating that the state has
cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut . . . and Roe v. Wade.
U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1234, n. 4.
269
See O’Connor Et Al. v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) The Court stated that they:
[H]ave no talisman that determines in all cases those privacy expectations that
society is prepared to accept as reasonable. Instead, “the Court has given
weight to such factors as the intention of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment,
the uses to which the individual has put a location, and our societal
understanding that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from
government invasion.” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984).
See id.
270
See generally Gormley, supra note 7.
271
See United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220 (D. Haw. 1991), aff’d on
other grounds, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
272
See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
273
See U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1237-38.
274
Id. at 1234-35.
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considered the proper balancing of the benefits and harms of
privacy.”275 The court reluctantly concluded, that this was a
substantial state interest, though not sufficiently well supported in
the FCC’s record.276
The court’s skepticism is well founded. The extension of
privacy rights against the private sector is commonly supported by
the theory that such rights are essential to human dignity, to
maintain and develop one’s personality, and so on.277 Courts have
sometimes echoed these arguments in defamation cases.278
However, these arguments are problematic as constitutional
arguments. They are unlikely to hold up well in making the case
for the constitutionality of broad privacy regulation lacking the
historic pedigree of defamation.279 What exactly is “human
dignity?” Assuming human dignity is defined, should all actions
that violate human dignity be illegal?280 How is human dignity
offended if Safeway learns through a Safeway card that I am in the
habit of buying pineapples and do not own my own home? Our
intuitive understanding of human dignity and human rights is
probably sufficient to allow us to understand that we ought not to
275

Id. at 1235.
Id.
277
See Roscoe Pound, Interest of Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343, 362-63 (1915)
(privacy torts protect mental peace and individual comfort); Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy
as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962,
970-71 (1964) (individual dignity); Edward J. Bloustein, The First Amendment and
Privacy: The Supreme Court Justice and the Philosopher, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 41, 53
(1974) (describing the sensational exposure of the intimate details of a private life in the
mass media as a deeply intrusive impairment of the intimacy and inner space necessary to
individuality and human dignity).
278
See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 757-58.
279
See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. at 388. The Court stated:
One need only pick up any newspaper or magazine to comprehend the vast
range of published matter which exposes persons to public view, both private
citizens and public officials. Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is
a concomitant of life in a civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an
essential incident of life in a society which places a primary value on freedom
of speech and press.
See id.
280
See Zimmerman, Requiem, supra note 70, at 339. Stating that:
[A]lthough human dignity is an important value, it is hard to define, identify,
and measure. Moreover, the existence of an arguably fundamental interest in
dignity does not lead inexorably to the conclusions that law can or should shield
it from all possible assaults. Many important human values, such as loyalty to
friends or the love of parents for their children, are either unprotected by law
entirely or can be enforced by it only tangentially.
See id.
276
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be subject to torture by the police, or to starve prisoners of war.
But it does not bring us to the understanding that it is wrong for
businesses to collect data about their customers without the
customers’ consent, especially given the fact that we routinely do
this sort of information gathering in our ordinary private lives.281
While we often desire to conceal facts about ourselves from
others,282 we also at times have an interest in learning information
about others.283
A concept that sees information gathering for the purpose of
commerce as an offense to human dignity, must suppose that
human dignity is very fragile. Do we really need the federal
government to protect us from being embarrassed? Can we assert
a right not to be embarrassed? Surely a government interest in
protecting human dignity must be founded on something more
substantial than vague fears that someone somewhere may obtain
information about you and might use that information to try to sell
you products, or annoy you with junk mail.284 And how is it
consonant with human dignity to prevent businesses from
communicating truthful information about real events to other
businesses? What about the dangers to human dignity from
paternalism?
Whatever the interests in human dignity or
personality are, they are arguably not constitutional interests and
certainly not constitutional rights. These arguments are vague and
lack even the common-sense impulses that underlie the assertions
of government interest in regulating such things as alcohol,
gambling, and the like.
The next part explores how a government interest in privacy
regulation might be supported by the assertion of better-defined
interests, whether merely substantial or compelling.

281

See id. at 326-35 (describing sociological evidence on the value and function of
gossip).
282
See Prosser, Privacy, supra note 70, at 399 (1978) (sheer self-interest motivates
desire for privacy).
283
See infra pp. 124-30 (discussion on gossip).
284
To bring the issue of annoyance into perspective, consider that the Court has held
many times that the First Amendment protects unpleasant speech. Speech that angers the
public is protected. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (describing speech
that angers the public). To justify a ban on speech, words must incite a listener to
violence. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (stating that the speech at
issue must be “likely to . . . produce [a violent] action”).
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1. A Dubious Assertion of Market Failure
One position the government might take is to assert that privacy
regulation is not really an attempt to control speech at all, but is
merely an economic regulation intended to correct a market failure.
This theory assumes that consumers do not know how companies
are using the data collected about them or how extensive that data
collection is. According to this theory, the market needs more
information to operate effectively. The evidence of market failure
would be that consumers widely report concern about privacy in
surveys, but that the marketplace continues perversely with its
trade in consumer transaction data without offering “opt-out” or
“opt-in” programs. As far as government interests are concerned,
however, the support for this theory is relatively weak.
First, the regulations in question are clearly content-based.
These regulations turn on whether the information in question was
personal, described purchases, or was individually identifiable.
Let us assume for this discussion that the government admits to
regulating speech and states that its interest in regulating speech is
the asserted market failure.
The concept of market failure proposed by our hypothetical
defenders of privacy regulation is a flawed one. Some decades
ago, economists began to experiment with models of markets in
which they assumed away information costs or transaction costs.285
They noted that these markets satisfied certain definitions of
efficiency.286 These models were valuable for explaining certain
trends in real markets. But they were not intended to be used as a
normative standard by which to judge the operation of markets in
the real world, any more than it would be appropriate to use a
world in which labor costs, transportation costs, or material costs
were zero. In the real world, information is a scarce good along
with other goods.
The question of how much information consumers are willing to
purchase with their valuable time and resources is a question that
the markets themselves should answer. For example, the market
for lawnmowers would not be more efficient if lawnmower
285

See generally Aric Rindfleisch and Jan B. Heide, Transaction Cost Analysis: Past,
Present, and Future Applications, 61 J. MKTG. 30 (1997).
286
See id.
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companies were required to hand out 500 page reports on
metallurgy along with their products. According to the theory that
a failure of information represents a market failure, this booklet
would bring consumers closer to a state of perfect information and
improve efficiency. It is not rational, however, for consumers to
spend their time reading a book about metallurgy before
purchasing a lawnmower. Moreover, the benefits of reading the
information are likely to be little or none. Chances are low that the
lawnmower will malfunction due to poor metallurgy. Furthermore,
in acquiring the information, the consumer would incur
opportunity costs - the lost time he could have used for some other
purpose. Thus, moving a market closer to perfect information in
this artificial manner would not benefit consumers.
Should consumers want to do so, they are certainly free to seek
out information about how companies collect and use information
about them.287 Consumers are aware at a general level that this
practice occurs fairly extensively, as indicated by answers to
survey questions about their privacy concerns.288 But, it takes time
and resources to generate detailed notices of how information is
gathered and used. Given that there is little or no harm to
consumers from the gathering of this information in the ordinary
commercial context, it may simply be inefficient for markets to be
providing this information at all.
How do we reconcile this argument with the survey results
showing that consumers care about privacy? It is relatively simple.
Surveys report consumer preferences under circumstances that do
not force consumers to consider the costs of their choices. It does
not cost a consumer anything to say that he values privacy on a
survey.289 But in the real world, exercising that preference would
cost him time and perhaps money. Markets do not reflect
consumer preferences in a vacuum, but rather reflect how strong
287
Consumers can request to see the files that companies hold and can correct
mistakes, block disclosure, and find out where information about them has been sent.
Consumers can also check credit reports and insist on giving permission before
information contained in the reports are released. See American Survey: We Know
You’re Reading This, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 1996, at 28.
288
See, e.g., http://ibm.com/privacy.html; http//cnn.com/privacy.html (describing
each company’s privacy policies).
289
See American Survey: We Know You’re Reading This, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 1996,
at 28. (stating that while Americans feel they have “lost all control” over personal
information, they are still willing to fill out warranty cards, questionnaires, and surveys).
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those preferences are when compared to other preferences (such as
low prices for goods and services, or prompt customer service),
taking into account the costs of each. In other words, consumers
may say one thing while doing another. Because markets in reality
respond to what consumers do, not what they say, the markets
reflect the balance of costs and benefits in a way that surveys
simply cannot. For this reason, surveys are not a reliable guide to
how markets ought to respond. The failure of a market to produce
a good when consumers say they want it is not evidence of market
failure.
Insofar as consumer concerns about privacy matter enough to the
consumers to spur them into action, companies are responding by
offering more detailed privacy policies.290 For example, many
company websites offer links to the details of their privacy
Other companies are responding by offering
policies.291
affirmative benefits like free computers in exchange for consumer
information, which appear to satisfy consumer concerns about
privacy very well.292 As economist Tom Hazlett once observed in
discussing regulation of the broadcast industry, “what the
government describes as marketplace failure is, more often than
not, simply a failure by regulatory agencies to agree with choices
made by consumers.”293 This seems to be true of apparent market
failures regarding privacy as well.
2. Fraud and Identity Theft — Security, Not Privacy
A hard look at the ordinary business practice of collecting and
trading consumer information reveals little concrete harm to
consumers from which the government can assert an interest in
protecting them from. This is the main stumbling block those
asserting a government interest in privacy regulation will have to
face. The courts have traditionally addressed one concrete harm the existence of data about consumers in a database creates a target
290

See supra note 288.
See id.
292
See, e.g., Free PCs – With a Catch, WIRED NEWS, Feb. 8, 1999, at
http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,17783,00.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2000).
293
Thomas W. Hazlett, Market Failure as a Justification to Regulation Broadcast
Communications, printed in RATIONALES & RATIONALIZATIONS: REGULATING THE
ELECTRONIC MEDIA, (Robert Corn-Revere ed., 1997).
291
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for thieves, hackers, stalkers, and perpetrators of fraud.294
Arguably, narrowly tailored responses to the problems of fraud,
identity theft, and stalking are already embodied in other laws.295
There is no doubt that such activities are illegal.296 The question is
whether it is appropriate to take the additional step of regulating
private databases for the sake of lowering the risk of fraud and
identity theft?
First, one problem with this argument is that most types of
privacy regulations that have been proposed have nothing to do
with combating fraud. It does not matter whether a consumer has
notice or has consented to the inclusion of his data in a library of
information; if the database is insufficiently secure, he may still be
a victim of identity theft. Similarly, databases today that consist of
data collected without consent or elaborate notice provisions may
be very secure or very insecure. Thus, the security argument does
not help us to address the question of the constitutionality of an
“opt-out” or “opt-in” regime.
Second, some of the regulations contemplated and supported by
privacy advocates would actually make security problems
substantially worse. As a general matter, companies are more
likely to fall victim to fraud (for which consumers ultimately pay)
when they know less about the person with whom they are dealing.
If all a company knows is a customer’s name (for example “Tom
Smith”), it is likely to be bamboozled by somebody else calling up
and claiming to be Tom Smith. If the company knows the name
and social security number, it is slightly less likely to be
bamboozled; the pretender would have to know Tom’s social
security number, as well. If the company knows the name, social
294

See, e.g., AT&T Comm. v. Pacific Bell, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13459 (1998)
(holding that defendants had violated the Uniform Trade Secrets Act by using plaintiff’s
electronic billing databases for marketing purposes); see also, CCO Info. Serv. v.
MacLean Huter Mkt. Reports, 44 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that databases
should be protected from illegitimate use by third parties and that Congress should be
able to protect such compilations through the copyright laws even if a directory contains
absolutely no protectable written expression); see also, Jones v. Federated Fin. Reserve
Corp., 144 F.3d 961 (6th Cir. 1998) (involving a person who obtained a credit report on
roommates ex-spouse).
295
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (1999) (stalking); CAL. PENAL CODE § 13848
(2000) (prevention of technology related crimes); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190-25 (1998)
(criminal impersonation); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.45 (stalking in the fourth degree); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.21 (2000) (misuse of credit cards); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2903.211 (2000) (menacing by stalking).
296
See supra note 295.
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security number, and fingerprint or voiceprint, Tom’s imposter is
going to have a very hard time. Insofar as privacy regulation
makes it more burdensome for companies to exchange analysis
about perpetrators of fraud and person’s identities, it is likely to
increase, not decrease, losses from fraud.
Identity theft is a particularly hard problem to address. If
someone claims that a certain purchase on a credit card bill is not
really his, how do you know he is not lying? One can only know if
one can establish his identity, and the identity of the purchaser, but
that is precisely what is at issue. Therefore, the most appropriate
response to the problem of identity theft might be to develop
different enforcement mechanisms. Special courts could be
established to deal with identity theft, where victims could
establish their identities and obtain new identities more quickly.
The answer, however, is certainly not restricting the private sector
right to gather information.
Another respect in which privacy regulation might make security
problems worse is by demanding that consumers be able to access
the files of information kept about them to make changes or
corrections. The question then becomes, just who is this person
that is claiming the right to access Sally Jones’s file? Is it Sally
Jones or someone who happens to know her maiden name?
The reality is that informational security and privacy are quite
different issues. Often, the best solution to security problems is to
get more information about consumers, not less.
Privacy
regulations as proposed thus far are therefore mostly irrelevant to,
or affirmatively harmful to, security interests.
C. Narrow Tailoring
The final prong in determining if speech is commercial speech
requires that the regulation in question be narrowly tailored.297 In
cases involving commercial speech, the regulation need not be the
least restrictive alternative, but it should at least be shaped in some
way to carry out the government’s stated interest. How inquiries
into the constitutionality of private regulation turn out will largely
depend on the details of the regulation in question and the nature of
297

See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565 citing In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
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the governments asserted interest. This part offers a few general
observations.
Of the proposals to regulate the uses of data by private-sector
companies, the most narrowly tailored would probably consist of
regulations intended to address concerns about negligent or
reckless security practices or identity theft. These regulations
would duplicate existing common law obligations so that federal
regulations may not be needed. There is no reason to suppose that
private companies want to have insecure systems or treacherous,
psychotic employees. If such regulations were passed, they would
most likely have to pass a tailoring inquiry.
The next type of regulation concerns pure disclosure
requirements. This type of regulation would be particularly
tailored to the “market failure” argument described above. This is
not to say that disclosure requirements would not be somewhat
burdensome, particularly for small businesses. There is always the
question of how much disclosure is necessary, in what size font,
and whether or not anyone will read it.
The next most burdensome type of regulation would establish
mandatory “opt-out” lists.
Though these are much less
burdensome than “opt-in” requirements, for some uses of
information, “opt-out” may simply be inappropriate. If one is
collecting information on who does not pay debts, it defeats the
purpose of the list to allow consumers to “opt-out”. There may be
some uses of data, therefore, for which even an “opt-out”
requirement is too much.
The types of regulation most likely to run into substantial trouble
on constitutional grounds are “opt-in” requirements, or outright
bans on the transfer of certain information. The U.S. West court
found that “the FCC’s failure to adequately consider an obvious
and substantially less restrictive alternative, an opt-out strategy,
indicates that it did not narrowly tailor the CPNI regulations
regarding customer approval.”298 The FCC argued that because
several people that were asked to “opt-in” refused to do so or hung
up, no narrower regulation would suffice.299 The court found that
this evidence was ambivalent - the customers may simply have
been averse to marketing generally, and not responding to
298
299

U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1238-39.
See id.
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particular concerns about CPNI.300 The court missed a more
important flaw in the FCC’s argument - the FCC presumed that the
customers had a right to veto the company’s use of their CPNI.301
But the extent and nature of this right is exactly what is at issue in
this case.
Access requirements also pose a substantial constitutional
problem, because they appear to be unrelated to any substantial
government interest. For most uses of data (with the exception of
credit reports) it will not particularly matter whether the data in
question is in error. Additionally, access mandates undercut
attempts to fight identity theft and fraud.
Such access
requirements create security problems as previously discussed.302
Many mid-sized and smaller businesses, and any business in a
controversial line of trade, are likely to find the risk unmanageable
and the cost of setting up access mechanisms prohibitive. Access
regimes also have broad potential for abuse. For example, a small
store that sells gay, Christian, or pro-choice literature might find
itself bombarded by enough access requests from consumers, all of
which must be processed and answered according to regulation, to
overwhelm its staff.
CONCLUSION
The restrictions declared unconstitutional by the Tenth Circuit in
U.S. West affected only a certain type of telephone call related
data, and were specifically intended to address the use of that data
for marketing. Many proposed regulatory schemes are much
broader, such as those in effect in Europe, proposed in various U.S.
states, or in Congressional bills proposing to regulate the collection
of information over the Internet. The fact that the U.S. West court
could not uphold the constitutionality of the privacy regulations
proposed by the FCC suggests that broader regulation will face
significant obstacles in the courts.

300

See id.
See generally id. (At issue in the case were regulations requiring
telecommunication companies to obtain affirmative approval from customers before the
company could use a customer’s CPNI, presupposing that customers could refuse such
approval.).
302
See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
301
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Restricting companies’ use of information about transactions and
consumer preferences raises troublesome First Amendment issues.
Throughout history, people have generally been free to learn about
one another in the course of business transactions and other day-today contacts. Restrictions that alter this default rule sweep a
potentially enormous pool of facts and ideas out of the shared
domain.
The conflict between privacy regulation and the First
Amendment provides an occasion for the courts to re-examine
certain peculiarities of the tests for the validity of commercial
speech and private speech. Problem areas in the current speech
doctrine include: (a) placing a higher value on certain types of
truthful speech than other speech, particularly the idea that
commercial speech is of low value; (b) the treatment of outright
bans on commercial speech under a higher standard of scrutiny
than partial bans. If a ban is only partial, this properly goes to the
question of the narrowness of tailoring, not the standard of
scrutiny; and (c) the view that commercial speech is easily chilled
because it is for profit. This factor cannot distinguish commercial
speech from newspapers or other publishing activities.
Assuming that current speech doctrines remain fundamentally
unchanged, however, courts should be skeptical of privacy
regulation for several reasons. The government’s asserted interest
in privacy has not been convincingly articulated. The real harms
that might be occasioned by the existence of a database, such as
the use of the data in fraud or identity theft, have little to do with
privacy. Fraud concerns are not addressed even by restrictive
“opt-in” requirements except in the broad sense that “opt-in”
renders the creation of many databases impossible, and thus may
lower an individual’s risk of identity theft by some miniscule
factor. Because the exchange of information actually helps to
combat fraud and identity theft, regulations are likely to do more
harm than good.
The “injury” that stems from the collection of data most often
brought forward by advocates of regulation - harm to the human
personality or risks of embarrassment - relies on an exaggerated
view of human frailty. The view that we have a right not to be
embarrassed or made uneasy by collections of information has no
constitutional status. In fact, courts are traditionally skeptical of
such subjective harms that border on the imaginary. This parody
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from The Onion perhaps best makes the point:
New “Phone Book” Raising Serious Privacy Issues: Palo Alto,
CA—Alarmed by the “ever-shrinking security and rights of
individuals in the information age,” the Palo Alto-based group
Citizens For Privacy is calling for strict controls to be placed on
“phone books”—printed directories of all the telephone numbers in
a specified area. “With this new piece of technology,” CFP head
Nadine Geary said, “anyone could know your phone number in
literally seconds.” Exacerbating the situation, Geary said, is the
fact that, in many cases, the subject’s address is also printed right
next to the number. “If this device is allowed to be distributed,”
Geary said, “literally anyone would be able to track you down at
any time. It’s frightening.”303

303
http://www.theonion.com/onion3213/indes3213.html (visited October 30, 1997)
(on file with author).

